How High Quality Are Your Lawyers? (How Can You Tell?)

This is a column about wringing our hands.

Our first text, from the Old Testament conventional debate, stems from today's WSJ story on "Axiom Legal," headlined Newcomer Law Firms Are Creating Niches with Blue-Chip Clients, discussing the business model of Axiom and other firms, which is to provide highly credentialed attorneys to corporate law departments on a contract or project basis, typically at savings of 25-50% vs. what an AmLaw 100 firm would charge.   Other components of the model are:

• The lawyers are recruited very very selectively—about 1 in 100 applicants to Axiom gets hired, according to its founder;
• Their pedigrees need to be gilt-edged, with backgrounds from places such as Cravath, Simpson Thacher, and Davis Polk;
• Work is typically performed directly at the client's, or the lawyer's home office, drastically cutting real estate overhead; and
• Axiom lawyers are provided benefits whether or not they're working on a particular engagement, but obviously only get paid for work performed.

Firms such as American Express, Cisco, Deutsche Bank, GE, Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, Sun Microsystems, UBS, and others, have signed up and Axiom's revenue was $39-million 2007 and is "on pace" to be about $66-million this year.  So, yes, it's a real business, even if it will never be an existential threat to BigLaw in the complex deals or litigation.  Stuart Popham of Clifford Chance puts it nicely:  "Clifford Chance has always been at the forefront of developments in the legal world and welcomes innovation, but does not see it as a threat, nor as a challenge."

So what's the problem?  What's the conventional wisdom about this?

For that, we go to the source for the voices of the anonymously-empowered cranky observers who comment over at the WSJ Law Blog.  Herewith a sampling from the piece covering the Axiom story:

• For all the prancing and hot air, they’re still just another temp agency peddling flesh that didn’t cut it on the most grueling track. An unfortunate and painful fact of life is that excellence in the performance of legal services can’t be delivered by dilettantes. People with “other interests” — whether it’s playing with their kids or writing an opera — may very well be healthier and more interesting people than those who wed their souls to the inhuman demands of private law practice. But they are not going to be as good lawyers. There is always a market somewhere for less-than-excellence at a discount price. Temp firms like this one serve it. But please, enough about the “special” quality of their inventory.
  
  
• It is fascinating that, yet again, the perception is voiced that unless one is willing to work ridiculously long hours and bill exorbitant rates, (not to mention in expensive suits and behind mahogany desks) that the resulting work product is not good. Says who?
  
  
• This [article] highlights a mindset in the legal market which consistently causes larger corporations to pay exorbitant premiums for legal services of questionable quality. However, it ignores that “pedigree” and large firm experience are not reliable indicia of quality touches on a demonstrable fact that is largely ignored by the legal market…

  That salient fact being that at most large law firms, in the first several years of practice, the only experience that associates receive is doing work that could be handled by a competent paralegal or secretary. Moreover, in large firms, the billable hour and marketing requirements generally mean that the amount of quality mentorship conducted between senior attorneys and those highly compensated young lawyers who are mostly engaged in doing the work of a clerk typist is minimal.

  By contrast, in a small firm environment, the working relationship between partners and associates tends to be very close, with ample opportunity for supervision and mentoring. Further, opportunities for all manner of legal tasks come to associates much more quickly. The natural consequence is that after six years of practice, an attorney whose lack of pedigree limited her options to small firms is likely to be a much more polished professional with significant amounts of meaningful experience in the actual practice of law. By comparison, after six years in a megafirm, the associate is likely to be paranoid, jittery and harried from the toxic work environment, while having very little meaningful experience in the actual practice of law.

• There certainly are “bet the ranch” matters out there that warrant elite law firms. But 99.99% of what big law firms deliver is overpriced. These guys have identified a nitch [sic: niche] that is waiting to be filled.
  
  
• Axiom’s model works if you assume all Axiom projects will have plenty of lead time for staffing, have discrete start up and wind down dates, will keep the lawyer fully utilized during the project term, won’t morph into additional projects, won’t have intermediate deadlines that require late nights or weekends and won’t require supervision or input from other practice areas. If this was realistic, no one would ever leave big law. It’s the lack of control that causes stress, and once you have all of these variables in play, it’s going to be the same no matter what sign is on the door.

What exactly is problem these commenters—and the existence of Axiom to begin with—are highlighting?

I submit it's an inability, or at least a failure, of clients to measure quality of legal services.  With no real handle on what's extraordinary work, what's acceptable work, and what's unacceptable work, clients buy the "proxy" of prestige firm, law school pedigree, and, yes, high hourly billing rate. 

Axiom is attempting to perform arbitrage on that market by promising the gilt-edged pedigree (erego the 1 in 100 hiring number, which sounds impressive regardless of its statistical integrity), without the prestige firm name and without the eye-opening hourly rates.  As an admirer on general principles of firms that try to find localized market failures and capitalize upon them, I am glad to see Axiom evidently successful and growing. 

On the other hand, it strikes me they have not addressed the core market information failure, which is clients' consistent and nearly universal inability to assay quality of their lawyers.

Back in February, Steven Pearlstein wrote a column called Failure in Need of a Theory in The Washington Post (online version now only available for $$), positing the following:

"I'm wondering if we need a new theory of relativity for economics, where the standard models are unable to explain a growing number of situations where highly competitive markets are delivering less-than-optimal results.
The recent credit bubble is one example of a very big market failure for which we all will pay a serious price. But other, smaller failures also come to mind.
Think of skyrocketing tuitions among elite colleges and universities that spend lavishly on winning sports teams, rock-climbing walls and scholarships for those who don't even need them, all to attract top students.
Or the runaway compensation for chief executives who would be willing to take the job for half of what they are being paid.
Or the ridiculous prices paid for "it" handbags, fancy watches or houses in the Hamptons.
How do we explain why cities are still tripping over themselves to offer subsidies for baseball stadiums and convention centers in the face of overwhelming evidence that these diminish economic efficiency and welfare rather than enhance them?
And how is it rational that first-year associates at top law firms are paid more than federal judges? ...  And how many law firms have sacrificed the quality of their work and the collegiality of their culture to improve their profit-per-partner, the all-important metric in the annual American Lawyer rankings?" [Emphasis supplied]

Mr. Pearlstein fingers the culprit as "relative competition:"

"One thread that runs through all these "market failures" is that they involve a kind of competition in which "winning" is more a relative concept than an absolute one -- that the goal is not so much to maximize profits, income or welfare, as economic models assume, but to beat the competitors. In the process, perfectly rational investors, businesses or consumers wind up doing things that are irrational, leaving them no better off than before.  ...  The desire for ever-bigger homes, ever-fancier gas grilles, ever-more powerful SUVs is based not on some absolute notion of what is good or sufficient, but rather on the relative basis of what everyone else has.  ...  [As] Chuck Prince, the former Citigroup chairman, who famously gave this explanation last July for why Citi was continuing to lend aggressively into what everyone could see was a credit bubble: "As long as the music is playing, you've got to get up and dance.""

Now we're getting somewhere.

AmLaw firms seeking to confirm their prestigious status (or aspiring thereto) cannot compromise on matching the "going rate" for associates, or on the pedigree of law schools they draw their partners and associates from, nor (once the overhead expenses associated with those decisions have been assumed) on their hourly rates.  They can't compromise not because it's purely rational homo economicus behavior:  No, the reason they can't compromise is because none of their peers is compromising.

But we still haven't broken the "quality" code.

Our second text, from The New Testament a Fortune 500 law department, tries to do just that.  In an email I received earlier this week from Jeff Carr, GC of FMC Technologies (granting me permission to share it, by the way), he writes:

"Bruce – interesting exchange on egos’s, capitalism and win ratios as opposed to P3 (profits per partner) data.  Here at FMC Technologies we maintain that the best and most effective way to approach this issue and to align divergent interests with performance and value is to use a performance based pay system.  Nearly 100% of our engagements are on one of two models.  The most simple, and the one that would in our view address your points as well as those of your interlocutor, is the “report card system.”  We directly tie compensation to evaluations – firms receive between 80% and 120% of the amount billed based on how they do on 6 criteria.  Our evaluation form and fee calculator is attached. 

We have over 1000 attorney evaluations in our own database and we are very disciplined in performing the evaluations and delivering the results to the firm – indeed we stack rank our firms with the other firms.  If you want to increase performance and customer satisfaction, all one needs to do is to unleash the competitive instinct of a bunch of smart, overachievers, tell them that they aren’t at the top of the heap compared to our other legal service providers!  Our experience with this system yields demonstrated results – firms are making more than 100% of their invoice (on average) and our total legal costs are static absolutely and down as a percentage of revenue.

If we in-house folks started to aggregate customer focused evaluation data, we would create a very powerful and very real assessment of attorney and firm capability, effectiveness and value."

Here's a screenshot of the evaluation form:

On a 1 to 5 score, from unacceptable through mediocre, good, and very good to excellent, the criteria are:

• Understood client's goals
• Expertise
• Efficiency
• Responsiveness
• Predictive accuracy (about budget and results); and
• Effectiveness.

Then there is the uber-question:  "Would you recommend that we use this attorney/firm for similar work in the future?"

But wait, there's more. 

In its one-page, plain English "Covenant with Counsel," FMC specifies additional conditions and expectations.  Among the more fascinating, FMC will:

• Organize and participate in “after-action” reviews at the conclusion of each matter to help us continuously improve performance
• Be flexible, accommodating and creative in dealing with potential conflict of interest issues that may arise
• Provide training opportunities for your associates through short term secondments or other creative arrangements
• Understand that this relationship is built on mutual trust and that by eschewing a “no stones unturned” approach, we accept some risk.

And the Firm will:

• Bill you fairly and understand that you seek neither education, elegance, new law, nor perfection unless these provide value consistent with your company’s objectives.
• We will always seek simple, effective solutions
• Seek to reduce our costs creatively and constantly and share those savings with  you while also increasing our profitability
• Not ask for blanket conflict waivers and be responsible to bring actual or potential direct, client or issue conflicts to your attention
• Exploit technology to our mutual benefit.

In other words, FMC establishes specific performance criteria for its outside firms, evaluates their adherence to those standards discipline, and rewards firms that excel (and punishes those that fall short) by specifying up front that the final fee may be from 80% to 120% of the estimate.  As Jeff summarizes (my emphasis):

"It's not rocket science, it just takes discipline.  If you pay for hours, you tend to buy hours regardless of quality and effectiveness.  If you reward performance, then your firms will perform."

Start thinking creatively (BigLaw and F500 firms, I'm talking to all of you) about what "quality" in legal services really means.

Enough with the hand-wringing already.