Monday 6 September, 2010

January 2006 Archives

If that call came in to your firm tomorrow morning, where would it go?

If the answer is, "anyone's guess," and if you consider your firm "a player," you have some work to do.

Consider that at last week's Davos meeting of the "World Economic Forum," one of the more outspoken hedge fund managers asked, "Why can buyout firms take public companies private and make enormous returns, while the same type of returns seem out of reach for public companies and their shareholders?"  While the reasons for private companies to outperform their public brethren are extremely complex, not to mention hotly disputed, the market today (meaning the people who have billions at their disposal to invest) believe it so, and are acting accordingly. 

Just listen to The Wall Street Journal's year-end wrapup (for 2005, emphasis supplied):

"It was the biggest year for mergers and acquisitions since 2000, with $2.9 trillion in announced deals, up 38% from a year ago, according to research firm Dealogic. The list included Procter & Gamble's $60.8 billion buy of Gillette [...]
Dealing was also brisk in the technology sector, led by the $11.4 billion private-equity buyout of SunGard Data Systems....   Private-equity firms racked up a record year, with $493.8 billion in deals, or 17% of total global volume. Nine of the 10 biggest private-equity deals on record happened this year, according to Dealogic, including the $15.3 billion buyout of Danish telecommunications firm TDC by Kohlberg Kravis Roberts, Apax Partners and others and the $15 billion buyout of Hertz by Clayton Dubilier & Rice, Carlyle and Merrill Lynch Global Private Equity.
Look for more of the same next year, with private-equity acquirers hunting in packs, making bigger deals possible."

No kidding about the deals getting bigger:  "With some private equity funds raising as much as $10 billion, the conversation has turned to whether there will be a day when a $100 billion fund arrives, fundamentally changing the landscape between public and private businesses." 

But isn't there a limit to how large a fish private equity can swallow and still create the out-sized market returns they've enjoyed so far?  To the contrary:  Some of the smartest money is betting that "the next big opportunities [are] not in small companies but in big companies, where the inefficiencies are writ large. As one big private equity investor said, "The bigger the company, the better chance it is badly managed.""

O'Melveny & Myers chimes in:  "The buyout funds are red-hot, having reached unprecedented sizes."

So which law firms are getting the lion's share of this business?  According to Bowne, in North America last year the leader in buyout transaction volume (number of deals) was Kirkland & Ellis (31) and the leader in total value of deals was Simpson-Thacher at just shy of $16-billion.  Other familiar names included Weil-Gotshal, O'Melveny & Myers, Latham, Cleary-Gottlieb, and Ropes & Gray.   In Europe, meanwhile, the volume leaders are Linklaters, Clifford Chance, and Lovells, with 65 deals between them, and in value, Clifford Chance is #1 at nearly €19-billion, followed by Freshfields at €11.5-billion.  US firms include the usual suspects:  Weil-Gotshal, Cleary, White & Case, Willkie-Farr, and Shearman and Sterling also make respectable showings, solidly in the top ten in terms of deal value.

So my point would be?

Be nimble, be flexible, above all be aware of macroeconomic developments.  Lucrative practice areas do not materialize out of thin air; they are the creatures of capital flows around the country and around the world.  Five years ago hedge funds and private equity were relatively somnolent, certainly in the public's eyes and even in the eyes of relative financial sophisticates.

The world changes, and the composition of its demand for top-of-the-pyramid legal services changes in sync.  Incumbents at the top today have no inalienable right to their privileged status.  On what  more optimistic and energizing note could you conceivably begin your week?

David Maister confesses

"I have spent twenty years trying to say all professions look similar and can learn from each other, but I’m finally prepared to concede that lawyers are different – and it has nothing to do with economics."

In a piece titled "Warlords and Dickensian Factory Owners," David compares the modern day law firm to both feudal peasants terrorized by the warlord into paying tribute, and the Dickensian factory where you can, in fact, make an awful lot of money if you work people to the bone, slash costs, and have a heart of stone at the mere mention of phrases like "work/life balance."  

Partners defend this approach by appeal to economic necessity in the short run:  "If we don't keep PPP up, we'll lose our rainmakers and the firm will be devastated." 

Doesn't this fly in the face of what by now are mountains of research showing that genuinely engaged and energized employees, sharing a firm-wide vision, are the strongest driver of profitability known to management science?  Yes, it does:   But it takes years of consistent vision, and action, to get to that point.  What's worse, none of the energy expended in creating that environment shows any financial return until, essentially, the environment has been transformed.  Wall Street's, or your partners', insistence on performance this quarter is hard to square with that time-consuming and uncertain investment.

This is also where "lawyers are different" comes in. Consider that lawyers are socialized unlike members of any other profession or followers of any other discipline:

"Martin Seligman [writes] in his book AUTHENTIC HAPPINESS: “Lawyers are trained to be aggressive, judgmental, intellectual, analytical and emotionally detached. This produces predictable emotional consequences…he or she will be depressed, anxious and angry a lot of the time”."

Or, consider a psychographic test measuring "sociability," with the median American defined as scoring 50 on a 1—100 scale:  Lawyers' mean score was 8.  Put 250 Type A's with that personality profile in charge of a $100+ million/year enterprise, and you should not expect a touchy-feely environment to spontaneously emerge.

But we're serious here, folks. 

Is the only way to create a high-performance organization to yell, chastise, berate, intimidate, and generally treat your "colleagues" as enemy aliens?  It is most assuredly not the only way; but it has an indisputable track record of being a way.  And, not to discount its attractions, it has the virtues of simplicity, directness, and economy of action.  As everyone from NFL coaches to Parris Island drill sergeants would testify, it dispenses with the need to painstakingly psychoanalyze what subtle combination of persuasive buttons need to be pushed—in different combinations for each person, of course—to motivate your troops. 

I will further grant there are times and places where peremptory and unilateral emergency injunctions are called for:  Maister uses the examples of a combat unit or a small child nearing a hot stove.  But these are surely far removed from towers in Manhattan's canyons. 

But back to the short-term pressure cooker vs. the longer-term vision needed to escape this inhumane behavior pattern.

In Practice What You Preach, Maister reports the results of a survey of 6,500 people in 139 offices of 29 firms in 15 countries, which demonstrates conclusively (to me at least), that employee attitudes drive profitability, and not the other way around.   What "attitudes" would those be, precisely?

  • A palpable sense of engagement is number one.  Are people "turned on" by coming to work? Can they tell you, without prompting and in a convincing fashion, what the firm stands for?

If this describes your firm, congratulations!  (And I'm available for interviews.)  But skeptical responses to the call for such a vision, in places where it doesn't exist, are far easier to come by:

  • We don't have the luxury of thinking long-run.
  • Not everyone can be engaged, or wants to be; some just want to put in their time and get paid.
  • Whatever time we spend trying to move the firm in that direction is time not spent developing new clients and billing hours.
  • ...and you can fill out the list.

And lest you think I'm casting aspersions on people who think that way, or that I believe it's only partners who have these attitudes, let me hasten to add that these attitudes are understandable, they're not intrinsically abusive, and clients and associates often feel very similarly, albeit from their own perspectives. 

Associates can feel that they're only in it to pay off their law school loans, or to get enough experience to be able to credibly interview for inhouse positions.  Clients, increasingly, issue RFP's and sponsor "beauty pageants" before awarding work; institutional relationships of longstanding are increasingly rare.  And to firms that do win work from sophisticated clients:   Be careful what you wish for!  Requests for discounts, volume billing, and Procrustean itemization of activities and expenses (the better to micromanage their costs) are on the way.

Can any of this be changed?  Can we, in fact, ever get back to the days of longer-term thinking, and a willingness to invest both time and money to build an enduring firm with a distinctive identity?  Maister is pessimistic:

"I’ve tried logic. It hasn’t worked well on non-believers. I’ve tried presenting conclusive data. It hasn’t worked well on non-believers. I’ve tried appealing to matters of principle, standards, values, and meaning. It hasn’t worked well on non-believers.

"I no longer believe people can be “converted” on this topic."

For those still willing to try, because the cause is as worthy as they come, try these steps on the road to change:

  • Ignore the skeptics; you'll never win them over anyway.
  • Start with the believers, and talk to their needs.
  • Enlist allies.
  • Celebrate small wins.
  • Spread the word.
  • Win a few more.
  • Keep telling the story.
  • Welcome the converted fence-sitters who decide you must be doing something right.
  • And keep telling the story.

Questions for your managing partner, executive committee, and executive director:

Is your  firm as profitable as it could be?   How does it measure up vis-a-vis its peer group?  And what defines that "peer group," precisely?  Do you ever wonder what you could do to improve its margins?  Structurally or strategically, precisely what would that entail?

If you're reasonably typical, the answers are:

  • In all honesty, probably not
  • I'd rather not comment
  • Uuuuh, instinct; we know them when we see them
  • All the time
  • If I knew, I'd change my answers to #1 and #4

The rest of what you're about to read won't answer those questions, certainly not in any glib and snappy way, but read on if you'd like to learn about some ground-breaking empirical research into the structure and profitability levels of the AmLaw 200.

What follows is a highly selective and distilled excerpt of and extrapolation from a paper forthcoming in the University of North Carolina Law Review (84 N.C. L. Rev. __ (2006), draft version available at SSRN), by my good friend Prof.  William Henderson of Indiana University Law School at Bloomington. 

The paper is titled "An Empirical Analysis of Single-Tier vs. Two-Tier Partnership in the AmLaw 200," and among a host of other fascinating findings is the creation of a statistical model attempting to explain the level of Profits per Partner (the "dependent variable," in statistics-land) based on an extremely limited number of quantifiable factors (the "independent variables").

If you were creating such a model, what would you nominate for your universe of independent variables?  What, in other words, drives PPP—what is most relevant and determinative?

Brainstorm for a moment. [...]

Time's up.

  • Leverage?  Defined strictly as [total # of lawyers/# of equity partners].  Yes; it's in the regression analysis, although with a counter-intuitive and surprising caveat.
  • Average billable hours per lawyer?  Yes again.  (That was an easy one.)
  • Whether the firm switched to a two-tier model in the past decade in order to boost reported PPP?  Sorry.
  • "Prestige" of the firm, based on annual Vault and American Lawyer surveys?  Yes again.
  • Size of firm?  Bzzzz; nope.
  • How about "associate satisfaction," as measured annually the The American Lawyer, which tracks such measures as open-ness about firm finances, candor about prospects for partner, and a firm's commitment to professional development?  Yes; but see my remark about leverage.
  • Percentage of lawyers who are in New York?  Yes—so let's hear it for the home town.
  • Composition of practice areas?  Not in the equation, partly because it's not readily quantifiable.

This leaves us with five independent variables:

  • Leverage
  • Average hours billed
  • Prestige
  • Associate satisfaction, and
  • % of lawyers in NYC

Together, these five variables explain three-quarters (74.2%) of firms' profitability:

So relatively "immutable" factors, at least in the short to medium term, account for all but 26% of the size of the average AmLaw 200 firm's bottom line in terms of PPP; the most enlightened or brilliant management in the world (plus our fair- and foul-weather friend, luck) affect only one-quarter of the average AmLaw 200 firm's results. 

We can say more:  Being above the regression line means your firm is outperforming expectations; being below it, the converse.  Out of a sense of charity, Bill did not identify any firms below the line by name (although if you contact me directly, we can talk...).  On the other hand, some of the firms identified above the line enjoy particular circumstances that explain their unusual performance.  I'll select a few from the top right down (I know it's hard to read, but I have a larger copy):

  • Cahill-Gordon:  An outsized presence in junk-bond issuance, plus a notoriously tight-fisted cost control culture.
  • Simpson-Thacher and Davis-Polk:  Unbeatable prestige, making them law-firm-land's equivalent of "bulge bracket" investment banks.
  • Kirkland & Ellis:  The go-to brand in high stakes litigation, especially antitrust.  (And an unusually canny twist on the two-tier partnership model, which I'll discuss another day.)
  • Gibson-Dunn:  Supreme Court practice.

You get the idea:  It is extremely difficult to establish, or sustain, a position "above the line."

The good news is it's less difficult, given enough time and a consistent strategic approach, to move up the line.   To move up the line, you dial in changes in those famous independent variables:  Leverage, % of our lawyers in NYC, average billable hours, prestige,  and associate satisfaction. 

For which of those do you get the biggest bang for the buck?  Back to our friend, the regression analysis.  The following table displays the value, in annual profits per partner, of a one-unit increase in each of our variables.  A few explanations and caveats first:  Remember first and foremost that these are values derived from the entire universe of AmLaw 200 firms.  As they say, "your mileage may vary." 

Second, the meaning of a "one-unit increase" depends on which variable you're talking about.  A one-unit increase in the leverage ratio, or the average number of hours billed, is fairly self-evident, but a "one unit" increase in prestige, and in associates' likelihood of staying for the next two years, reflect the subjective scales on which they were measured.  For "prestige," Vault uses a 10-point scale.  (For example, in 2003, Cravath and Wachtell each scored a stratospheric 8.93, Davis-Polk 8.12, and Simpson-Thacher 7.78.)  For "likelihood of staying," The American Lawyer used a 5-point scale.  Finally, for "% NYC/Global," Bill simply divided the AmLaw 200 into four roughly equal cohorts: 0%; < 10%, 10—50%, and > 50%.  Jumping from one cohort to the next one above is our "unit" increase. 

The envelope, please:

Variable
Single-Tier Firms
Two-Tier Firms
Leverage
$134,854
$42,637
% NYC/ Global
$413,534
$400,618
Likelihood of Staying
[not statistically significant]
-$249,057
Avg. Hours Billed
$35,534
$50,982
Prestige
$340,293
$161,787

The more you think about these numbers (at least if you're like me), the less surprising they are—except for the third row.  This says, beyond a reasonable doubt, that for two-tier firms, the more likely associates judge they will be to stay two years, the less profitable the firm:  And you're taking it in the teeth.  A one-unit increase in associate satisfactions costs you a cool quarter of a million dollars a year. What on earth is going on here?

I have my own theories, which I'll discuss, again, another day.  Suffice for now for me to toss out this (I hope) pregnant thought:  Paraphrasing Tolstoy, "all single tier firms are alike; each two-tier firm is two-tier in its own way."  Single-tier land is a flat, homogeneous landscape.  Two-tier land is heterogeneous geography, full of recently thrust-up peaks and cleaved valleys. 

Have no fear that "Adam Smith, Esq." is going to morph into a boot-licking, reverential conduit for re-distributing the year-end natterings of those ink-stained scribes from the MSM and the high-profile consultancies hoping to goose their annual bonus by producing yet another "ten trends..." or such-like:  The predictions tend to the bullet-proof, in that they flunk the fundamental tenet of vector analysis, which is that to fully specify the characteristics of a vector one must define it in all four dimensions (the fourth being time, or with objects in motion, speed).  "X is going to increase/decrease/start/stop," but omitted is where, when, or how fast.

(And lest you think I harbor a secret intellectual temptation to indulge in potentially-entertaining year-end prognostication myself, take a look at David Maister's comment to an earlier post: 

"With no disrespect to any law or consulting firm named here, I am deeply skeptical about all this. In the past, when asked to talk about the "Trends in the Profession" I used to use a 10-year-old slide which referred to no specific profession or country. Everyone fell for it - they all agreed that, yes these are the trends we will have to face.")

Nevertheless, sometimes consensus surveys are used to extrapolate trends, and they have value if only for the snapshot they provide of the common wisdom at a point in time.

Consider, then, CIO Insight's year-end survey of nearly 6,000 CIO's and CTO's (64%) and other top executives (36%), which generated no fewer than thirty "trends." 

A prefatory note:  The results of some of the non-trend-generating questions are intrinsicially interesting.   Two of the more hopeful:  #1:  "Our research also indicates that companies are giving more employees access to business intelligence tools, in hopes they apply the insights those systems generate."  Knowledge is power; distribute power lest it corrupt.   And #2:  78% of companies plan to increase profits through growth, not cost reduction. Gordon Bethune, the legendary former turn-around CEO of Continental Airlines, like to make the latter point with his pizza analogy: "The biggest cost component of a pizza is the cheese; if you're serious about cutting costs, eliminate the cheese."  

Off, then, to the trends.  And don't worry; I've narrowed their thirty down to four of note to us:

  • Trend 7: The Hunger for Analysis and Intelligence Will Keep Growing:  By this, they mean "Business Intelligence," and specifically what I've called the second generation of "BI:"  "Already, mid-level managers and planning staff use BI tools at 61 percent of companies. [...] This widening use of ever more powerful analytical tools has enormous potential for the future. But the extent to which that potential is met will depend on how well the BI system connects to strategy and user needs."
  • Trend 22: IT Architecture Becomes Critical to Business Strategy:  "What once appeared arcane will become more and more central. As high-growth companies have figured out, IT architecture and infrastructure have never been so closely tied to corporate strategy as they are today. It doesn't matter whether CIOs are trying to achieve faster growth, better business processes, lower costs or global expansion."  In other words, the basic "hygiene" of your information systems has to be rock-solid.  (1) Secure, reliable data (2) shared across all your offices and employees (3) on a common platform.
  • Trend 24: Data Integration Is the Technology Pressure Point:  "Data quality will go from nice-to-have to need-to-have. Flexibility and openness remain nothing but talk, while standardization and virtualization remain useless, unless companies can reliably integrate their systems and ensure the quality of their data."  It's not just your corporate clients struggling with Sarbanes-Oxley that have to get their "data" squeaky-clean; it's your own firm as well.  Don't your clients have every right to expect you can and do handle your own data with the utmost scrupulousness?
  • Trend 27: Knowledge Management Regains Respect:  Isn't this the perennial whipping boy, the classic example of the "evergreen" prediction?  (My favorite is, "Brazil will lead the way the next decade," which we've been hearing since before Sputnik.)  But listen to what CIO Insight has to say at some length about KM (emphasis supplied):
    "CIOs haven't given up on its promise. Knowledge management has long suffered a bad rap as a sexy technology that falls short on delivering business value. But for two years in a row, KM has ranked a respectable 7th on our list of critical technologies. (Twenty-one technologies were ranked on this list in 2005.) This is happening in part because many of the technologies that fall under the aegis of KM have come into their own: collaboration tools, corporate portals, content management and business intelligence.

    "These technologies aren't mere repositories for knowledge, as earlier KM systems tended to be. They route knowledge to the people who need it, or embed what the company has learned into a process. As companies find these knowledge-managing technologies helpful, they'll look for new, effective ways to manage corporate know-how and put it to work."

I would be the last person to tell you that KM is easy, and I'm both unsurprised and essentially unperturbed that it's taking us so long to get it right.  We are, after all, dealing in some cases with "knowledge" that is so contextual and nuanced as to be almost ineffable.  And it's not just those at the peak of the empyrean professions:   Consider the story in today's WSJ of the technology columnist trying to make polite conversation with a FedEx guy in a high-rise office elevator.  WSJ Guy:  "So, is it quicker to work top to bottom or bottom to top?"  FedEx Guy (dead serious):  "It depends on the time of day."

Put that in a database!

Two new blogs of note:

  • David Maister's "Passion, People and Principles":  I sincerely hope you recognize David's name; if you don't, I implore you to take an immediate look.  His inaugural post is about his "blogging philosophy."  
  • "Truth on the Market," a joint blog with two "founders" and four "authors," each smarter than the last, and all law professors (at different schools) with a severe penchant for economics.   Any commonality among them?  They seem to over-index on having gone to Chicago Law School, clerked for prominent federal appellate judges (Posner, anyone?), and done a tour at Latham & Watkins.

Henceforth, you'll be able to find them on the "Adam Smith, Esq." blogroll.

As I've written before, "Business Intelligence" is  here to stay.  (And if that's an unfamiliar or unclear term to you, please refer to the earlier post on this, which serves to introduce the field; and no apologies necessary, as the term "BI" is almost perversely non-intuitive to the newcomer.  It only makes sense once one already knows what it means.)

BI 101 to launch this piece:  BI  is not to be confused with "competitive intelligence," which is all about how your firm is perceived in the marketplace vis-a-vis its competition, and about what the competition is up to—both current and potential competition.  BI, rather, is about analyzing the tremendous amounts of raw data spewed out by your firm's various systems. CIO Magazine defines it thus:

"But with Hillman Group's new BI system, curious business executives can query the system themselves and get instant answers about such critical questions as the number of unfilled customer orders, which is tracked by the system in real-time.

"There's just one problem.

"The new system hasn't made the business better—at least not yet—only better informed. That's generally the problem with BI, the umbrella term that refers to a variety of software applications used to analyze an organization's raw data (sales transactions, for example) and extract useful insights from it. Most CIOs still think of it as a reporting and decision support tool."

The CIO case study involves a computer sub-systems manufacturer and a chemical company, but the key realities of BI come through loud and clear:  (1) information is power, so your firm has to be prepared to share that; and (2) knowing that some of your partners manage things better than others cannot be seen as threatening, it must be seen as empowering. The goal is not to rap the poor manager's knuckles, but to show by example how he can emulate the good manager.

In law-firm land, BI can analyze the profitability of entire practice groups, of offices, of clients, of individual lawyers, and of individual matters. Of far greater importance than its ability to write a new gloss on historical experience is its ability to capture "best practices" and, if sensitively and astutely managed, to spread those best practices across the firm.  Who's doing BI?  Firms such as Alston & Bird, Bryan-Cave, and Goodwin-Procter, which I cite for reasons that will become clearer below, but permit me to seed your thinking by observing that all three of these firms place a noteworthy premium on "cultural" considerations.  (A&B, for one, has not landed above all other law firms on Fortune's "Best 100 Places to Work" a few years in a row by accident.)

The key to "second generation" BI is to conceive of it as more than a historical-reporting tool and begin to use it actively as a way to understand how you can do what you're already doing in better ways.  The management literature calls this "best practices" or "process management," but don't let the terms glaze your eyes over.  CIO Magazine, with its understandable CIO-centric perspective, puts it thus:

"Companies that use BI to uncover flawed business processes are in a much better position to successfully compete than those companies that use BI merely to monitor what's happening. Indeed, CIOs who don't use BI to transform business operations put their companies at a disadvantage. For CIOs who have carried out this difficult strategy successfully, there is no looking back."

Or, in plain English:  If you use BI as a rear-view mirror merely to point with delight and view with disdain, don't bother.  Instead, use BI to help you understand, at a fairly profound managerial level, why, for example, two different matters that appeared superficially similar generated remarkably different levels of revenue and profitability for the firm—and how to make the laggard look a lot more like the leader next time around.

Next point:  Does this have to do with technology?  Sure, and so does time-keeping.  The technology behind BI, in other words, should matter not to you.  BI is 1% technology and 99% culture.  BI can improve matter management, client satisfaction, and even professional development (by identifying, for example, associates whose write off rates are especially high or low).  These are things your firm must care about.  (Did I forget to mention profitability?)

As a friend of mine with no little experience in BI implementations in law firms likes to say, BI will only have an impact if your firm has "the will to act."   Do you?

Total world cross-border trade as a percentage of global GDP
1990: 18%
2015 (estimated): 30%
Computational capability of an Intel processor, as measured in instructions per second
1971: 60,000
2005: 10,800,000,000
Multiple by which e-mail traffic has grown from 1997 to 2005: 215
Number of US tax returns prepared in India
2003: 25,000
2005: 400,000

Do I have your attention?

My point is a simple, if oft-neglected, one:  "No firm is an island," and enormous macroeconomic, social, and business trends will affect how you do business, and what business you do.  Warren Buffett is fond of saying that "bad industries trump good management:"  If so, how do you know you will still be in a "good industry" 10 or 15 years hence?

This is where global strategic scenario planning comes in.

As previously noted, Clifford Chance engaged in just such an exercise late last year.  With the help of Oxford Analytica, CC's worldwide managing partner Peter Cornell and his management team were able to re-conceive the firm's strategic direction by focusing on the three scenarios Oxford Analytica built:

  • China being removed as an economic opportunity thanks to their invasion of Taiwan, prompting economic isolation;
  • The US becoming fed up with its foreign adventures and withdrawing into isolationism; and
  • Instead of globalisation, the world regresses “back to the future” — countries and continents become separate and protectionist. For instance, America and Europe construct trade barriers to block cheap imports from China and India.

As both The Lawyer and the Sunday Times noted, none of these scenarios is supposed to be "right," in the sense of being an accurate prediction of what will actually come true.  What, then, is the point?  The point, which could scarcely be larger, is to have the firm's leaders think deeply about whether its strategy is aligned with where the world might be going.  If "change is the only constant," you cannot foretell the future by linearly extrapolating 3—7% compound annual growth (let's say) in revenue, headcount, and profits:  More fundamental shifts are surely in store.  

Or, as Cornell put it, the world is dynamic:

"Cornell told The Lawyer: "So many strategic reviews are done in a static environment, but we have to get used to doing them in a dynamic environment."

"The review also underlines Clifford Chance's shift away from practice area groups to a more geographical focus."
Chiming in, from the Times:
"Already the law firm plans to implement a change in its corporate strategy. From now on, strategy will be be less practice-based and more geographically focused. In other words, instead of seeing its divisions as, say, banking, energy or commodity practices, it will think in terms of China, North America or Latin America in future."

But wait a minute, whence this focus on geography? Aren't we supposed to be focused on clients, which means industries, which means practice specialties?

Clifford Chance may be right after all, at least if you believe McKinsey's "Ten Trends to Watch."  Trend #1, extrapolating ten years hence, is:

"Centers of economic activity will shift profoundly, not just globally, but also regionally. As a consequence of economic liberalization, technological advances, capital market developments, and demographic shifts, the world has embarked on a massive realignment of economic activity."

Sounds like geography matters.

What else does McKinsey think we need to factor into our strategic planning?   Most germane to law firms:

  • "In many industries, a barbell-like structure is appearing, with a few giants on top, a narrow middle, and then a flourish of smaller, fast-moving players on the bottom."   Hmmm, sound like any industry we're familiar with?
  • As firms become bigger and more far-flung, "Long gone is the day of the "gut instinct" management style. Today's business leaders are adopting algorithmic decision-making techniques and using highly sophisticated software to run their organizations. Scientific management is moving from a skill that creates competitive advantage to an ante that gives companies the right to play the game."  This means you need to pay serious attention to "business intelligence" software, for starters.  Its effective deployment across your firm will indeed become table stakes—I assume only that your partners care about profit levels.

Thinking long and hard about these potential (and, I would argue, highly likely) developments, as McKinsey puts it drily, "will be time well spent."  Clifford Chance is there:  When will your firm be?

I'm on the New York State Bar Association's "Committee on Law Practice Management" and, for the record, I wanted to invite all and sundry who might be in the New York area to our annual meeting Thursday, January 26, 2006, from 1:00—5:00 pm at the Marriott Marquis in Times Square (1535 Broadway @ 45th Street, 7th floor; and I expressly disclaim any responsibility for the selection of venue).

This year the program is titled:  "In Case of Emergency: Emergency Planning and Disaster Recovery for the Law Firm Everyone Needs a Plan," and will address that issue from the perspectives of human resources, finance, records, IT, and physical facilities.  More info here.

Seventeen years before The Wealth of Nations (1776), Adam Smith published his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), nowadays a relatively neglected work which, to my mind, is nearly as astute, deserves far greater current recognition, and which not-incidentally puts pad once and for all to any charge that Adam Smith was unsympathetic to human nature or cavalier about the consequences of his theories for individuals.  Merely contemplate the book's very first sentence if you doubt me:

"How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing it."

One reviewer nicely summarized its relationship to Wealth of Nations as follows:
"To truly understand Adam Smith's economic masterpiece "The Wealth of Nations", one must understand its moral foundation. Without Smith's essential prequel, "The Theory of Moral Sentiments", the more famous "Wealth of Nations" can easily be misunderstood, twisted, or dismissed."

So, to today:  Harvard Business School's Working Knowledge has a piece positing that the Theory of Moral Sentiments was the original intellectual precursor to what we all know today as Behavioral Economics.  [The HBS WK article refers enticingly to the primary source, "Adam Smith, Behavioral Economist," published in the summer 2005 edition of The Journal of Economic Perspectives, but the troglodyte JEP keeps its online archives under severe lockdown—trust me, I tried.]

The premise of the HBS piece, "Adam Smith, Behavioral Economist" is that Moral Sentiments and Wealth of Nations, which Smith never sufficiently inter-connected during his own life, nevertheless together constitute the intellectual foundation of how human psychology (including incentives, preferences, risk-aversion, and the endless struggle between immediate and delayed gratification) affect how people behave in markets:  In other words, Behavioral Economics.

"Smith's two main works—The Wealth of Nations (WN) and The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS)—show him to be a brilliant economist and arguably a brilliant psychologist, but he was never fully able to bring the economics and psychology together."

One of the primary arguments of TMS is that human behavior is driven by passions—fear, desire, and greed among them—but that these passions are moderated by an "impartial spectator" looking out for the individual's long-term interests.  And there's apparently something to the theory:  Using it, the Harvard professors designed a "commitment savings product" for banks in the Phillipines that required customers to sign a contract prohibiting them from withdrawing funds until a certain amount of time had elapsed or a level of principal value had been achieved.   According to them, this "had a large and significant effect on clients' total savings," resulting in increased home purchases, educational investments, and small business-building.

But it's when we come to Smith's bedrock belief,  intimated in the opening sentence above, in the importance of trust, concern for fairness, and reciprocity, that the linkage of human psychology to market functioning becomes most clear.  Smith believed that those values become more, not less, important as markets evolve.  For example, with many of the professions, most assuredly including our own, clients cannot monitor "quality" in real time—and the same goes for doctors, auditors, and financial advisors.  So trust and reputation stand in where cold economic calculus fails.

Likewise with corporations:  Shareholders must at a fundamental level trust management to operate in the shareholders' interest since the range of variables over which management has control or influence is far too vast to specify contractually (and such a hypothetical specification would also be obsolete the moment it was completed).

Finally, Smith recognized, and placed great value upon, "the aerial coin of praise," and social and professional status, as critical motivational ingredients.  Reputation ("the aerial coin") is the flip-side of trust; one trusts those who have earned their blue-chip reputations.  And Smith would have insisted on the most scrupulous care and feeding of reputation, if for no other reason than the dire consequences attendant upon its destruction.

More currently, consider this (emphasis supplied, hat tip to Larry Ribstein): 

"The market is capable of levying harsh penalities [for financial malfeasance] on its own. Recent evidence comes from Karpoff, Lee and Martin, The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books (July 25, 2005). Here’s the abstract:

"We examine the penalties imposed on all 585 firms that were targeted by SEC enforcement actions for financial misrepresentation from 1978-2002. Consistent with the view that penalties are small, monetary fines were imposed on only 7% of the firms. A larger fraction, 36%, faced class action lawsuits from investors. Overall, however, the penalties imposed on firms through the legal system appear to be small, as the unconditional mean total of all legal penalties is only $14.3 million per firm.

"The penalties imposed by the market, in contrast, are huge. Our point estimate of the reputational penalty - which we define as the expected loss in the present value of future cash flows due to higher contracting and financing costs - is over twelve times the sum of all penalties imposed through the legal and regulatory system.

"For each dollar that a firm misleadingly inflates its market value, on average, it loses this dollar when its misconduct is revealed, plus an additional $2.47. Of this additional loss, $0.18 is due to expected legal penalties and $2.29 is due to lost reputation. This evidence belies a widespread view that financial misrepresentation is disciplined lightly. To the contrary, reputational losses impose substantial penalties for cooking the books."

So next time you're cynically thinking that money is the only motivator, try putting a price on your reputation; Smith would have.

Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington—where my good friend Prof. William Henderson teaches—will be hosting a symposium on "The Globalization of the Legal Profession" Friday, April 6, 2006.  I'm pleased to report that I will be one of the panelists.

On the agenda:

  • Law Firm Strategy in a global world, including "What management structures are necessary to govern a global law firm with offices on multiple continents?"
  • Relevance of Geography, including "Are some locations, based on longitudinal growth patterns, emerging as truly international legal cities for firms attempting to fit the transnational model?"  Or, phrased differently, why are more firms hoisting their flag in New York, London, and Hong Kong, despite those cities' having among the highest operating cost structures on the planet?
  • Convergence, including:  "Can transnational law firms successfully balance the competing goals of higher profitability and professional autonomy? To what extent is the practice of law, and identity of lawyers, converging around certain practices and values? If so, are those practices/values those characteristic of the US legal profession?

The conference will be in a somewhat hybrid format, blending the academic with the practical and hands-on, and all papers and presentations will subsequently be published.

If anyone is interested in attending, please email me; I can testify that hospitality at the Law School is of the highest order.

Last week I met the head of Bloomberg's relatively new "Law" initiative, aimed at putting $1,500/month Bloomberg terminals on the desks of senior partners and general counsel. 

Before I describe what "Bloomberg Law" is about, I invite you to take a look at their brand-new offices (between 58th and 59th, Third and Lex), which are a visual and experiential delight unmatched since "Star Wars"—with the distinction that these spaces actually function.

As we all know, Bloomberg is already The Name Brand in financial intelligence, with over a quarter of a million subscribers to their core business and financial market information resources.  Bloomberg has also long since gone multimedia, with Bloomberg TV and Radio, a suite of magazines and publishing resources, and, lately, podcasts.  So what does Bloomberg Law offer?:

  • a comprehensive set of legal, regulatory, and compliance databases;
  • news, both real-time and archival;
  • rankings;
  • company and biographical information;
  • legal research tools; and
  • of course, all the rest of Bloomberg's financial news, data, and analytic applications.

The head of Bloomberg Law, Constantin Cotzias (a Brit who practiced at Denton Wilde Sapte and elsewhere) is unapologetic about the price of the terminals and unabashed about the scope of Bloomberg Law's ambitions compared to competitive offerings:  "Well, if you want an Audi, you should buy an Audi, but if you want to go nought-60 in 3 seconds, you really need a Ferrari, don't you?"   So what exactly can this Ferrari do for you?

For the co-chair of Orrick's New York bankruptcy group, Lorraine McGowen, it enables her to research and discover companies potentially on the brink of financial meltdown, identify their bondholders and unsecured creditors, and tailor a custom-made pitch letter drawing from (say) the content of actual loan agreements retrievable online, as well as more sophisticated tools such as "relative value" rankings—Bloomberg's rating of the operational strength of a firm vis-a-vis its peer group.  In keeping with Bloomberg's high-quant-quotient roots, here are some of the tools available to analyze likelihood of default:

"Specify whether you want to solve for the Altman Z-score, the Double Prime Z-score or the Hillegeist Z-score. [Prof. Edward] Altman [of NYU's Stern School of Business] developed his original Z-score for manufacturers. The Double Prime model is more suited to nonmanufacturing companies, while the Hillegeist formula generates a probability of default in addition to the Z-score."
Westlaw, this ain't.

For Brandon Becker, co-chair of the securities regulatory practice at Wilmer-Hale in Washington, it permits him to analyze trading patterns in a security tick-by-tick and view breaking company news surrounding those patterns, as well as to see how other companies in the same industry were trading simultaneously.  Armed with this information, he obviously has a far clearer view of whether insider trading is something to be concerned about.  (Obviously, the same tools arm both plaintiffs' and defense attorneys.)

I intend to stay in close touch with Constantin; for people who need bleeding-edge tools, I for one would put my money on Bloomberg without looking back.

Bloomberg LAW Screenshot

Regular readers will know that I'm a firm subscriber to the Law of Unintended Consequences, which is also why I try to exercise consistency in analyzing "dynamic" and not just "static" effects of a proposal.  Clarification:  The "static" effect of Rule X is simply what it says.  "Mandate airbags in cars," for example.  And the static result will be that new cars will come with airbags. 

The "dynamic" effect is how either people's behavior (most likely) or the pertinent environment (less likely, but worth consideration) will change as a result of the new mandate.  With all-but-universal airbags, we now know that drivers perceive the increased margin of safety as license to drive faster or otherwise less cautiously (knowing the consequences of an accident have been, on average, reduced) with the ultimate result that vehicular injury rates remained essentially unchanged—while accidents produced less serious injuries, there were more of them.

A second core, or at least default, belief of mine is that Disclosure Is A Per Se Good.   One reason I gravitated to practicing securities law is that, conceptually at least, I believe the (US) securities laws can be summed up as follows:  "You have permission to do anything, so long as you fairly disclose what you're doing."  (I will not insert any editorial commentary here about whether Sarbanes-Oxley graffiti'ed over that pristine canvas, but will leave it to those who still do securities law and commentary for a living.)

Which brings us to the SEC's newly announced initiative to require complete, thorough-going disclosure of all forms of compensation to CEO's and other top corporate officers—and to do so, for a change, all in one place, that place not to be inscrutable proxy footnotes.

A value will have to be put on everything from stock options and the use of corporate jets to Metropolitan Opera tickets, skyboxes, maid service, and the ugly new duckling on the block, "gross-up's" to pay taxes on all these perks.  As The New York Times' Joseph Nocera puts it:  "All in all, it's going to be a pretty sickening sight."

And we're talking real money here:

"According to Lucian A. Bebchuk, an executive compensation expert at Harvard, from 2000 to 2003, the total compensation of the five best-paid officers of all publicly held companies amounted to 10 percent of corporate earnings."

Ten percent!  You can argue methodology until the cows come home, but whether it was 8 or whether it was 12, it is to my mind "highly material." And: Ethically unconscionable, socially divisive, morally corrosive, economically indefensible, and (by rights) personally humiliating.    Then again, as Graef Crystal, "grand old man of executive compensation critics," observes, "it turn[s] out that when somebody is hauling in $200-million, he's not embarrassable"—even though the current ratio of CEO pay to that of the average worker at the same company is 400:1.

Litany of the caveats:

  • No one should gainsay true entrepreneurs outlandish wealth:  Bill Gates, Michael Dell, and our own Mayor Mike Bloomberg deserve everything they've got.  We need more of them, not fewer.
  • "It's a free country," and some combination of shareholders, Boards of Directors, and institutional investors could slam on the brakes; the fact that they have yet to do so suggests at least as an initial proposition that the competition for top corporate officers is not a completely malfunctioning marketplace.
  • And most importantly, it is not the job of the SEC, Congress, Joe Six-Pack, or yours truly to enforce what might be our own views of decorous behavior on top executives.

Rather than view with alarm (since the facts speak for themselves), and rather than propose any reforms or remedies (see bullet #3, supra), my aim is simply to shed some light on how we got here.

We got here, largely, by trying to shed light on corporate compensation practices in the first place.

Remember back in 1993 when Congress eliminated the tax-deductibility of executive salaries in excess of $1-million?  Two things happened:  First, this added rocket fuel to the growth of stock option grants; but second and even more interestingly, $1-million/year on the W-2, rather than becoming a ceiling, became the new floor.

I fear we're about to re-run the same movie.  Under the new rules, not only will you and I learn that GE is paying for Jack Welch's Red Sox tickets, so will every other current or former CEO.  And if history is any guide, anyone in that club still suffering the indignity of buying MLB tickets himself will be on the phone to their comp. committee in about 30 seconds.  Full disclosure, meet the law of unintended consequences.

Now, what has this to do with law firms?

The American Lawyer's profits-per-partner ranking, is what.  At this point in the industry's trajectory, my own view is that TAL's PPP figures (and all their other financial-performance metrics) are simply a given.  Rightly or wrongly, like them or loathe them, view them as invasions of privacy or refreshing beams of sunlight, we are living with them:  If you don't like it, "Get over yourself," as we say in New York.

That does not mean, of course, that they are without consequence.  While the competitive one-upmanship of our friends (and clients) in the Fortune 500 may be unseemly in the extreme, we are not immune from jealous glances.  Just as corporate compensation packages will be different before and after mandatory disclosure, so our profession's compensation structures are not merely reflected in the inanimate and passive mirror of the TAL figures:  Over time, that mirror profoundly influences the landscape it takes in.

Your firm is dedicated to client service as one of its pre-eminent goals, if not the absolutely highest priority, right?

Not so fast.  Do you have a lawyer serving full-time as "Client Services Advisor," serving as an ombudsman on behalf of the firm's clients and responsible for creating and overseeing more than 60 "client service teams" (and counting)?  Akin-Gump does, in the person of Iris Jones

Iris Jones

Swell:  What's a "client service team?," you're asking.

Essentially, it's a tool for formalizing and institutionalizing collaboration among the various lawyers serving Important Client X.   An example will aid understanding even better than a description.  Here's how the "Technology-Copyright-Internet" group works:

"The TCI attorneys participate in client service teams with Akin Gump’s patent attorneys, litigation attorneys and other practice groups. This collaborative commitment to client service enables Akin Gump to assist in providing clients with comprehensive counseling in all areas of IP and overlapping areas of the law."

The goal is to approach the client relationship from the perspective of the client's business (and its concomitant legal needs) rather than from the perspective of the firm's legal expertise (which may or may not be germane to the client's business).    My friend Bruce Marcus also describes this approach.

The latter approach—starting from the perspective of the firm rather than the client—is conceptually just plain mistaken. 

In practice, what does this really mean? 

  • First, as noted, it requires genuine collaboration.  Teams need to be assembled and re-assembled as the client's business and legal posture changes.  Now the team may need some focused litigators; next quarter an offshore tax expert; and the quarter after that an employment maven.  Iris Jones' job is to stay on top of all this and make sure that today's "A Team" doesn't become tomorrow's "Irrelevant Team." 
    Does this mean partners need to "buy in" with their heart and soul?  Check.
    Yes, this can be the hard part:  We all know that collaboration is not in the law school curriculum.  But never underestimate the power of self-interest to trump training.  As one Akin-Gump partner put it:  "In an increasingly competitive environment, the client service team has been invaluable in [strengthening] our relationship."
  • Second, it requires plain old information-tracking.  Call it "Client Relationship Management" if you like, but lawyers must have one centralized repository for everything germane about the client's legal needs and the history of its relationship with the firm.  We've all had the experience of phoning (say) the cable company to ask a service-related question or inquire about a bill, only to find ourselves forced to explain everything from square one with a succession of several different people.  As uninspiring as this is with the cable company, it leaves a positively ghastly impression coming from a supposedly sophisticated law firm.
  • Lastly, it means the client service team has to have a vision of where the client fits within the firm's strategic plan—a vision which is both clear and nuanced.  Lest I be accused of throwing around the phrase "strategic plan" loosely, I'll try to define it:  "Strategic plan" in the sense I mean it is not the 3- or 5-year document delivered from the mountaintop and promptly shelved for terminal verboseness or immediate irrelevancy (the latter fate being nicely described by the epithet "OBE," or "overtaken by events").  Rather, a strategic plan in this sense is a continuously evolving awareness of the fit between (i) the marketplace's specific demands; (ii) the firm's ability (or short-term lack thereof) to meet those demands; and (iii) how the firm can develop to most closely align its capabilities and offerings with the evolving market.

Note the focus throughout is on "the client" and "the market" rather than "the firm" or "the lawyer."

We have all known in our heads for some time, even if we have not acted on it with our hearts, that excellent legal skills are merely the price of admission in today's globally competitive market.  That means they cannot pretend to be your distinctive calling card; they're table stakes.

What could provide an enduring distinction, on the other hand, is responding to your clients' business (and, as a follow-on thereto, legal) needs with the same alacrity and professional focus the client itself would apply internally.  Client service teams may not be the only route there, but they surely start at the right end of the service spectrum.

End of an era?

Peter Cornell's decision not to stand for re-election as global head of Clifford Chance certainly feels that way, although as we've argued before, his timing is impeccable. 

Now comes an interview with The Lawyer in which Cornell reprises his five-year tenure and concludes with some words of advice for his (unchosen) successor.  As regular readers know, I subscribe to the theory that individuals forge events, not that events forge individuals, so it's worth pausing to reflect along with Peter at the transformations he's wrought at Clifford Chance.   (Full disclosure:  I've met Peter in person and have the utmost respect for him both as a managing partner and as a human being.)

First, let's review the bidding:  When Cornell took the helm at Clifford Chance in 2001, the firm was, to say the least, fractious and divided.  The recent merger with (acquisiton of) New York's Rogers & Wells left the firm over-indexing on its share of nettlesome and truculent personalities, and the disconnect between Rogers & Wells legacy eat-what-you-kill compensation system and Clifford Chance's UK-heritage lockstep was to prove an expensive, irksome, and distracting mess until pretty much this past year. 

Add to that simmering turmoil Clifford Chance's triumphant-at-the-time swoop in 2002 to gather up many of the people left on the street in Northern California when Brobeck imploded—a classic case of buying in at the top—and Cornell's hands were full.  Nor should we forget the revolt of the Italian partners in 2002, or the infamous leaked memo from associates about the pressure to produce billable hours.  That episode, perhaps more than any other, encapsulates the pressures on Cornell, so it deserves extended treatment:

"The associates' memo - dubbed 'Paddinggate' - was a particularly difficult moment. The memo, which was leaked onto the internet in October 2002, exposed US associates' morale as rock bottom. Even more damagingly, it said that pressure to bill could have led to a situation where bills were being padded. There has never been any suggestion that this was actually happening, but the mere mention of it got the world's business press salivating.

"Arthur Andersen had collapsed just a few months previously, and The Lawyer has spoken to a series of partners who candidly say that many felt they were facing something similar. Most admit that Cornell was admirably calm under extreme pressure.

" "I appreciated very early that we had to take this seriously," confesses Cornell. "It didn't matter that it wasn't a real story: this had legs and could do the firm a lot of damage. We had to close it down.""

So those were the challenges; what is Cornell's legacy?  (Understanding, of course, that there's no such thing as a "legacy" in a people-intensive and people-driven business; there's only, shall we say, a platform going forward from which to attract and retain the right people.)

First of all, Cornell has struck through the Gordian Knot of lockstep vs. eat-what-you-kill compensation with a partnership-approved referendum late last year to establish the principle of three different equity ladders for different global jurisdictions (reflecting inherent profitability differences), and which also puts partners on a triennial evaluation cycle, where they can be "frozen" at their current point-score or moved down and even accelerated to annual reviews.

Note that this was approved after a 2003 failure to get approval of another modified-lockstep proposal; so "coming back to the well" was not risk-averse behavior.   Cornell's reaction to criticism?:  "Criticism? It bounces off me pretty much."  Next time you're considering your own suitability for managing partner, consider this remark.

And the numbers should speak for themselves:  CC's PPP is projected to hit £850,000 this year ($US 1,515,000) vs. last year's £710,000 ($US 1,265,000).

But ultimately, the question of interest is how did Cornell go about achieving what he did?

It comes down to people. 

"Cornell still seems most comfortable talking about the intangibles. If anything, he seems a natural senior partner rather than a managing partner. Not for him the sliderule approach to cost per lawyer and profit margin; rather, he prefers to talk about whether the partnership is… well… happy."
Care to dimensionalize this?
"In a one-on-one situation he's very good," says one partner. "He doesn't get into details. He usually finds something of interest to you and you'll feel good about having the conversation. Pete's style is to absorb other people's views and not to indicate a view of his own."

How many times do we pay obeisance to the bromide that ours is a people-centric profession, but then fail to acknowledge the importance of the viewpoints of our people? Cornell is a counter-example.

So, after having taking Clifford Chance from, if not the rocks, at least the gathering storm, what are Cornell's parting words of advice to those who are, or aspire to, managing partner?  Pithy:

  • Focus on the big things
  • Extend your network—down to junior partners and associates
  • Delegate
  • Be consistent
  • No bullshit
  • Be thick-skinned

To those who still feel called to the challenge, all rise.

Courtesy of The New Yorker:

Cheaper in Bulk

This is not to either recommend or condemn discounts for valued clients—that's a topic for another day!

The New Jersey Law Journal, with permission, re-published a recent post about Allen & Overy's new "managing associate" and "of counsel" tracks.  Many thanks to Ron Fleury, their nifty editor.

"Adam Smith, Esq." is honored and delighted to host Blawg Review #39; I consider myself in excellent company given the distinguished and talented people who have hosted Blawg Review in the past.  

This week we celebrate:

Epiphanyn.   1.  From the Greek epiphania "manifestation," often referring to the appearance of a divine being. Christ's appearance to Paul on the Damascus road was an epiphany. The word is used to describe the first appearance of Christ to the Gentiles in the visit of the Magi to the baby Jesus (Matthew 2:1-12), an event celebrated January 6.
2. Epiphany in fiction, when a character suddenly experiences a deep realization about himself or herself; a truth which is grasped in an ordinary rather than a melodramatic moment.

The most famous representation of "The Epiphany" in art history is doubtless Giotto's (more formally, Giotto di Bondone:  Italian, Florentine, 1266/76–1337) from New York's own Metropolitan Museum of Art:

Epiphany

My wife, who majored in art history at Vassar, has indelibly memorized this educational little ditty placing Giotto in art-historical context:

"Giotto, Giotto, Giotto-Giotto:  Renaissance
He paints in the morning and he paints at night;
If it's a Giotto it'll turn out right.
Giotto, Giotto, Giotto- Giotto:  Renaissance."   

Of course, here in New York City we celebrate the end of the 12 days of Christmas with our own tradition:  The annual rite of The Ceremony of the Mulching of the Christmas Trees, jointly supervised by the NYC Sanitation and Parks Departments:

New York's Strongest

Before we begin our cyberspatial tour, like all accomplished explorers, we need to be well-equipped.  To that end I commend to you Google Pack, a handy-dandy Swiss Army-knife compilation of everything the Prepared Scout of virtual-space needs, from Adobe Acrobat and Firefox to anti-virus and anti-spyware armor.

Let the tour begin!

Alito Fireworks

"Adam Smith, Esq." is resolutely non-partisan and apolitical.  That said, without question the best-quality daytime drama scheduled for this coming week will be the nomination hearings for Judge Samuel Alito to SCOTUS—they promise an extremely high entertainment-value quotient, and I for one intend to Tivo them in their entirety.  But for commentary and observation, I'll turn to those who plow these fields for a living, starting with the newest addition to the Law.Com "Inside Opinions:  Legal Blog Network," the consummately qualified Howard Bashman of How Appealing.

The "Epiphanic Moment" ("EM") from this post is Howard's intimate knowledge of the witnesses who will be testifying in favor of Alito this week: "I know about all of these judges as a result of having handled numerous appeals in front of the Third Circuit over nearly the past sixteen years and having clerked for a judge serving on the Third Circuit for two years before that. Here are my quick insights..."

Our friends at Law.Com have their comprehensive "A Field Guide to the Alito Confirmation Hearings."  You were expecting, perhaps, a red hawk pair nesting above Fifth Avenue?

Meanwhile, over at the Electronic Privacy Information Center, they've a remarkably comprehensive complete copy of a conference report from the Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library at Princeton University—the conference in question taking up "The Boundaries of Privacy in American Society," chaired by none other than then-Princeton-student Samuel Alito, who was responsible for putting the conference together, doing the research behind it, and preparring the "remarkable summary that accompanies the final report."   This should have the C-SPAN junkies going back to their Red Bull's for stamina.

NSA Surveillance Fireworks

Also on the late-breaking political newsfront, we have the story that our very own NSA ("No Such Agency") has developed an expertise in data-mining that Wal-Mart would envy, but rather than applying it to how our household purchases index on Crest and Pampers, they've applied it to determine how many degrees of separation lie between you and Osama.

Jay Leno has his own take on this revelation:

According to a new poll, President Bush's approval ratings are on the rise. A lot of these polls are phone polls and people were worried Bush is listening in.

Kierkegaard Lives, a new blog to me, provides a "wire-tapping link repository" aiming to constitute one-stop-shopping for digerati running down primary sources on this. 

For the attention-span challenged, yesterday TalkLeft uncovered a Congressional Research Service report questioning the NSA/White House's authority.  EM from the summary:

"The 44-page report said that Bush probably cannot claim the broad presidential powers he has relied upon as authority to order the secret monitoring of calls made by U.S. citizens since the fall of 2001."

For the record, I do not subscribe to the cynical view of this imbroglio that it's merely a matter of whose ox is being gored—that if you're an upstanding American citizen you have nothing to fear from the snoops, so what's your problem, buddy? Rather, I view the debate as the latest incarnation of the timeless, "no permanent solution" tension between human liberty and free and open societies, and the reality that "the Constitution is not a suicide pact."

Lawyers Behaving Badly

This topic can only be introduced by:  "Where oh where to begin?!"

f/k/a reports on a lawyer who:

"... gets three months in jail for being one of the two major actors in a complicated scheme to steal millions of dollars [$25.6-million, in fact] from people he himself describes as "decent, hardworking people looking for an honest way to resolve their debt issues.""
How is this possible?  Maybe the judge was swayed by character witnesses, or the lawyer's own questionable character:
"Attorney Lisa B. Shelkrot came up with the usual defense gobbly- gook, including: "What stands out [in letters from prominent members of the community] is his selflessness and commitment to service." "It was a fear of destitution, not a high flying lifestyle ... that lead him to this.  Sinnott had a "deeply and tragically" flawed personality."

My EM question to Ms. Shelkrot:  Are you yourself buying that for a second?

And since when does being "flawed" exempt you from responsibility for the consequences of your premeditated actions over a period of years?

We don't apply this standard in dealing with children or dogs, and it's not time to start with grown, bar-passing adults.

More seriously, Jack Balkin asks whether it now "seemed as if there was no legal proposition, no matter how outlandish, that you couldn't get some prominent lawyer these days to defend."  Answering his own question, he writes:

"Lawyers have always, to my knowledge, been willing to come up with clever and ingenious arguments for the interests they represent."
But he's only warming up:
"Put another way, we have all known for many years that lawyers are rhetorical whores; their job is to confuse, obfuscate, and make unjust and illegal things seem perfectly just and legal, or, if they cannot quite manage that feat, to muddy up our convictions sufficiently that we conclude that it's a close case. There is nothing new about this."

"Nothing new?" Meaning it's essentialy an ineradicable and hopeless condition? Well, not quite. EM moment in bold (my emphasis:
"Lest I be misunderstood, I do not mean to say that law and legal doctrine counts for nothing, and that lawyers have no independent role to play other than as political cheerleaders for one side or the other. Rather I mean to say that the law always needs help from other sources in political culture if it is to do its job appropriately. The rule of law, I would insist, is not a purely legal or professional ideal-- it is a political ideal."

TalkLeft decodes what motivates outstanding federal prosecutors to go to the defense side—and questions whether they ever really make the transition.  "The real problem is most of these former high-level prosecutors can't make the mental shift. They don't have it in them."   Or, as former Deputy Attorney General James Comey puts it in a quote so rich you couldn't make it up (EM in bold):

“You go from being paid to do the right thing every day, from having the freedom never to make an argument you don’t believe in, to being a defense attorney, where you are duty-bound to make the best argument you can,” he told the New York Law Journal. “I have a tremendous respect for people who do defense work, and it’s not lying, but in a private moment, sometimes, you say, ‘Geez, this is a bunch of baloney.’”

And you really  anticipate even a soupcon of "zealous representation" on behalf of a criminal defendant from Mr. Comey?   TalkLeft certainly doesn't:  "Pathetic...irksome beyond description."

For a moment's worth of comic relief, the always-reliable Walter Olson at Overlawyered chronicles a Dallas restaurateur who sued the Dallas Morning News over a review of his restaurant, "Il Mulino"—specifically, so it would appear, over the newspaper critic's take on Il Mulino's bolognese and vodka sauce.  I am pleased to be able to report that the matter has been settled without admission of much of anything, it seems, but with a promise of a second review from the newspaper.  "And you're ugly," perhaps?

The serious message here is simply, Who comes off looking worse?  The benighted restaurateur who exponentially increased circulation of the critical review by his action, or the lawyer who took good money from him to help?

Craig Williams, another Scottish lawyer with a penchant for economics, regales us at May It Please the Court with Major League Baseball's claim that it "owns" all baseball statistics.  The party offending MLB's expansive notion of the territorial reach of its intellectual property is one CBC Distribution & Marketing, a fantasy baseball game operator—dependent for the reality of its fantasy upon real-world baseball statistics.  EM of the post:  "Next thing you know, they'll be charging the fans to quote statistics to one another."

Mauled Again kicks off 2006 with a confident prediction:

"The culture of corruption, of bribery, of putting one's own selfish interests above those of the public one is required to serve will also trigger yet another easy-to-predict Top Ten tax story of 2006. At least one politician, one celebrity, and one lawyer will run afoul of the tax law by failing to file a tax return or by failing to pay income taxes."

What's to be done?   You might try starting young:

"It is a challenge getting across to law students the point that when they enter the profession, and even as law students, they are subject to a higher set of integrity standards than those that apply generally to citizens of the nation."

Put that on your refrigerator.

On a less consequential, but equally depressing, note, Matt Homann of "the [non]billable hour" reports seeing a serious-minded piece of advice that clients should not talk to their lawyers until the deal they're doing is completely worked out.   What on earth would prompt such advice?  "Our predominant business model"—the billable hour.

In contradistinction to the billable hour, Greatest American Lawyer advocates serious, candid discussions with clients about budgets.  The goal?  Try, "Truth."   

Over at Houston's Clear Thinkers, Tom Kirkendall writes about "The High Price of Asserting Innocence," and sees a vicious double standard infecting the Enron prosecution, wherein the right to defend oneself has essentially been emasculated by trigger-happy prosecutors and the federal sentencing guidelines' emphasis on co-operation as a get-out-of-jail-free card: 

"Last week, former Enron chief accountant Richard Causey pled guilty to a single count of securities fraud and agreed to a seven-year prison term after vigorously defending himself from multiple charges of business crimes for over two years. Had he elected to defend himself at trial against the charges and lost, he would have faced an effective life sentence."

Yet another triumph of the Law of Unintended Consequences; but lawyers created this injustice. Can't lawyers be expected to fix it?

Part of the problem may be that lawyers can't be expected to fix injustices if they simply can't be trusted in the first place.  To that point, Dennis Kennedy recounts the "baffling" decision of the Florida Bar's Board of Governors to prohibit lawyers from looking at metadata—presumably on the principle that gentlemen don't read other gentlemen's mail.  To my mind, the only conceivable rationale for such (a feckless) rule of "Enforced Ignorance" is that the children can't be trusted near the liquor cabinet.

Is there hope?  Point of Law writes about "Merit-Based Judging" and urges all of us (is the MSM listening, here?) to get the notion out of our heads that judicial decision-making is a clone of the legislative process, where all that matters are results.  Ted Frank comes out decisively in favor of hoping Alito will truly judge matters strictly on the merits, and even though Frank is confessedly pro-business, he argues correctly that "business is better off in the long run with a judge and judiciary that decides cases on the merits"  rather than "a hack judge who makes his or her decisions based on the identity of the parties in the caption." 

Wouldn't it be nice if a greater proportion of the American public (and again, the American media) understood that "decisions based on the identity of the parties" enjoys a one-for-one identity with being "a hack."

Finally, we can all breathe a sigh of relief—inbetween chuckles, anyway—at the extremely welcome news that The Bitch is Back

Practice, Practice, Practice

Lest you begin to form the impression that lawyers never get any real work done, we have an eclectic roundup of practitioners opining on their specialties.  I'm not sure any one of this exactly qualifies for an "EM," being, as they are, proudly technical and rational self-contained essays, you hey, you might learn something; I surely did.

  • Ever wonder about the extraterritorial application of US Antitrust Laws?  You understand, of course, that ever since Alcoa (1945), it's been settled that they do have some such reach.  Law & Society sets us straight (and I'm personally a sucker for their banner image).
  • Patent Baristas educates us on the USPTO's proposal to limit continuations, which have "become the current whipping boy."  (Who knew?!)  PB opines that "this has not been thought through very well," and as part of their argument to that effect notes (and trust me, I quote):
    "Note that proposed Rule § 1.78(f)(2) provides that for applications that fall under set proposed § 1.78(f)(1) above, there will be a rebuttable presumption that the nonprovisional application contains at least one claim that is not patentably distinct from at least one of the claims in the one or more other pending or patented nonprovisional applications. In that case, [etc.]"
    I'm willing to take them at their word.
  • Staying in IP-land for a moment, The Invent Blog notes that David Allen's "Getting Things Done" (a collection of techniques I heartily endorse), which relies upon tabbed folders for organization, wouldn't be possible without the handiwork of one James Newton Gunn, who in 1897 obtained a patent for tabbed folders and index cards.  Respect your ancestors, I always say!
  • My e-friend Ingo Forstenlechner has just completed his Ph.D. thesis titled "Impact of Knowledge Management on Law Firm Performance - An Investigation of Causality across Cultures" and wants to let you know that you can get a copy directly from him.  I'm sure Joy London already has hers.  Here's an excerpt from Ingo's abstract of the thesis: 

    "The set of cause and effect relationships at the heart of the [balanced] scorecard - referred to as the success map – is at the core of this research, which aims to investigate if the link between managing knowledge and financial performance really exists and – if it does – how it can be influenced." [And his conclusion?] [...]  "This thesis provides the empirical evidence for a link between KM and organisational performance."

  • Carolyn Elefant at My Shingle offers very practical advice (##'d 1 through 5, in fact) for people seeking contract work from local attorneys or solos.
  • And last, both Carolyn and I contributed to the launch of Law.com's "Career Center" earlier last week.

And The Final Word Goes to The Economics of Law Firms

I hope you all saw that coming.

Patrick Lamb, at  In Search of Perfect Client Service, essays upon "The Essence of Leadership."  The first thing he does, with a hat tip to Tom Peters, is distinguish leadership from management:  "Management has a lot to do with answers.  Leadership is a function of questions. And the first question for a leader always is "what do we intend to be?""

Those of you who were comparative lit majors may be interested to know that I took off from the same Harvard Business School paper Patrick is launching from, in a post of my own, here.

The anonymous Wired GC kicks off the New Year by turning his thoughts to New Ventures, and to the pilot fish that invariably accompany them in schools, your friends the Venture Capitalists, and The Top 10 Lies of VC's as recounted by Guy Kawasaki, who's in a position to know.  My personal favorite is #9 (EM included) :

"Do you know why we all know about Google's amazing return on investment? The same reason we all know about Michael Jordan: Googles and Michael Jordans hardly ever happen. If they were common, no one would write about them. If you scratch beneath the surface, venture capitalists want to invest in proven teams (eg., the founders of Cisco) with proven technology (eg., the basis of a Nobel Prize) in a proven market (eg., ecommerce). We are remarkably risk averse considering it's not even our money."

Gerry Riskin at Amazing Firms, Amazing Practices (who I know well, whom I hope to have breakfast with in New York this coming week, and who deprived the world of stand-up comedy of a potential ace when he stuck to law-land) turns the kleig lights on "old-fashioned bad management" at Dorsey & Whitney's London office, leading the en masse departure of 8 associates. What, Gerry asks rhetorically, does it cost to recruit 8 associates? And what firm would "dare subtract that number from the billing revenue of some maniac in order to determine compensation?" Another rhetorical question.   But the EM is this:  Thanks at least in fair measure to the blogosphere, dysfunctional people cannot remain anonymous.

Finally, the question you've all had in the backs of your minds, especially those of you contemplating hosting another Blawg Review of your own some day: Am I glad I did it?

Yes, I thoroughly enjoyed it!  I had the chance to delve deeper into some old friends, to meet some new ones (as it were), and finally, to point you all towards two of my own post-children of the past week:

It's good to be King For A Day.  Still, I hope I've done justice to Blawg Review #38's 10 Resolutions for Better Blogging.

And to all a good night, and a most merry and enjoyable 12 Days of Christmas next year.

Blawg Review has information about next week's host, and instructions how to get your blawg posts reviewed in upcoming issues.   Final Note: I'm also interviewed there.

 

Legal Times is asking, "What Five Questions Will Law Firms Face in 2006?"  I'd like to suggest there's really only one question, and these "five" are each just facets of the same phenomenon.

Their five:

  1. More merger mania?
  2. Soaring compensation?
  3. Billing rates topping out?
  4. Further cost cutting?
  5. Client relationships more critical still?

Mergers:  Although framed as an across-the-board issue, the fact is that merger activity is highly focused on firms establishing, or beefing up, their beach-heads in just two cities:  Washington, DC, and New York.  I've long been of the view that a Washington presence (which need not be jumbo-sized) is de rigueur for a national firm to be taken seriously.  We simply live in regulatory times, and it's almost irresponsible not to have the ability to join the legislative/administrative conversation at its primary source.   (No, I don't own any property on K Street, but I wish I did!)

New York is likewise critical simply because it's the financial capital of North America, as well as hub to industries ranging from publishing and advertising to fashion and—surprise—law itself.  But unlike DC, mere "presence" doesn't cut it here:  Firms need a critical mass in NYC to make it into the serious consideration set.  What's "critical mass?"  Roughly, north of 125 lawyers.

The biggest challenge is that in both cities, the pickings of merger targets are getting slim.   That's why I predict we'll see more and more smaller-bore mergers where national firms opportunistically pick up relatively little firms that have an attractive specialty.  Just as an example, Seyfarth Shaw picked up a Manhattan-centric real estate firm, Mandel-Resnik (specializing in representing co-op's and condos) as of January 1.   Total haul?  A grand total of seven partners—but arguably (and IMHO) an excellent fit, as real estate is a labor-intensive industry and Seyfarth Shaw is definitely a "go-to" labor law firm. 

Look for more of these rifle-not-shotgun targets.  But do not envision "merger mania" as an undifferentiated nationwide phenomenon.

Compensation:  Obviously, here are two "compensation" markets:  Partners and associates. 

As for associates, I predict we will finally see the pent-up dam burst, so to speak, and starting salaries will get the first bump-up (+$10,000 seems to be the number people are using) since the (in)famous dot-com-driven Gunderson-Dettmer pop to $125,000 in 2000.

The partner compensation market is also bifurcated, if you will, into the equity/non-equity market and the lateral market.  In a coincidence, today we also saw the release of the annual summary of financial results for the Top Ten Bay Area firms, and it tells a tale of high (and unsustainable) rates of growth in the ranks of non-equity partners, and extremely parsimonious additions to, or even subtractions from, the equity ranks.  Just a sampling:

  • Morrison & Foerster shifted 50 partners—15% of the entire partnership's ranks—from equity to non-equity.
  • At Pillsbury-Winthrop, the firm ended 2005 with 10% fewer equity partners than it began the year, despite absorbing Shaw-Pittman.
  • Gibson-Dunn, while LA and not Bay Area-based, switched to a tiered partnership last year.
  • Wilson-Sonsini is the only firm on the list that remains "single tier," without non-equity partners.

In other words, non-equity ranks are here to stay, or to grow.

As is activity in the lateral marketplace.  Don't think there's a war for talent?  Well, there is, and it's being fought primarily with the weapon of money.  Attractive laterals are not commodities, and the fight to gain and then retain them only escalated last year. 

Billing Rates:    Pressure from corporate clients to cut legal expenses increased last year and will only continue to rise.   So:

"The string of rapidly escalating billing rates has pretty much run its course," says Bruce McLean, managing partner at Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld. "We're going to have to find different ways to improve profitability."

The problem is that just what those "different ways" are is opaque, at least if firms limit their toolset to fiddling with billing rates. "Alternative fee arrangements?" Mostly imaginary. Or, as John Beisner, DC managing partner at O'Melveny, puts it somewhat drily: "There is a challenge to find ones that are broadly applicable."   In other words, plain old dumb discounting remains the order of the day.

Was I harsh with that "dumb discounting" jibe?  Yes and no.  Yes, I was harsh in that long-term, solid, favored clients deserve recognition of their status, and the clearest recognition is a break on fees.  Plus, the firm enjoys economies with established clients in that there's no new-business-development overhead.  But no, I will stand by it to the extent that just saying, "let me take 10% off—'special for you today!,'" as they say in New York, does not engender loyalty and in fact invites the question:  "If you can make nice money at 10% off, what sucker would ever pay full freight?  [And the next question is:  "How about 20% off?"]

The demise of the billable hour has been foretold so often that we've stopped covering it here; at least until there's some tectonic change in the landscape.  Suffice to say that imagination and innovation will ultimately prevail in billing structures.  We'll know it when we see it.

Costs:  Many strategies avail themselves here, and outsourcing seems to be the favorite son.  Far be it from me to disdain outsourcing—indeed, I've often noted that BigLaw can outsource to the Midwest or the South (internal offices or otherwise) without needing to skip 12 time zones away—but the issue of quality, perceived or actual, remains a live one.  If I'm a Fortune 500 GC hiring Cravath or Wachtel, do you think "outsourcing" is an option?

I would argue that same (correct and legitimate) mindset applies to almost any firm in the AmLaw 50, if not the AmLaw 200.  The back office is one thing, but substantive work?  First thing you know, that GC will say to him/herself:  "I'm not paying firm X 90¢ on the dollar to ship their work to Cleveland; I'll hire another inhouse person for 30¢ on the dollar."  Beware false economies.

The article makes pregnant reference to another potential source of "cost savings," to wit practice specialization.  The somewhat ham-handed attempt to make this point gropes at it obliquely by offering that "par[ing] down practice groups" may be "another option."

What "paring down," a/k/a specialization, means, is simply this:  Become a boutique. 

Client Relationships:  Aaah, at last the heart of the matter, and where all of these questions intersect. 

Think about it:  Mergers are driven by the need to offer a more complete offering to clients; compensation is driven by the war for talent, in order to serve clients; new billing initiatives are 110% driven by clients, not firms; cost-cutting matters only in a world where clients demand value for money.

As it should, it all comes down to clients

Which leaves us where? 

I suggest, back in the land of virtuous and vicious cycles.  Strong firms will deepen and extend their client relationships by providing a more compelling array of services from highly talented people priced to yield a compelling value.  Weaker firms will lose cost-conscious clients as their talent pool dwindles, billing models stagnate, and practice group offerings ossify.

It's not five questions, it's one:  How can your firm in 2006 get closer to your clients?

Your firm is dedicated to client service as one of its pre-eminent goals, if not the absolutely highest priority, right?

Not so fast.  Do you have a lawyer serving full-time as "Client Services Advisor," serving as an ombudsman on behalf of the firm's clients and responsible for creating and overseeing more than 60 "client service teamIris Joness" (and counting)?  Akin-Gump does, in the person of Iris Jones

Swell:  What's a "client service team?," you're asking.

Essentially, it's a tool for formalizing and institutionalizing collaboration among the various lawyers serving Important Client X.   An example will aid understanding even better than a description.  Here's how the "Technology-Copyright-Internet" group works:

"The TCI attorneys participate in client service teams with Akin Gump’s patent attorneys, litigation attorneys and other practice groups. This collaborative commitment to client service enables Akin Gump to assist in providing clients with comprehensive counseling in all areas of IP and overlapping areas of the law."

The goal is to approach the client relationship from the perspective of the client's business (and its concomitant legal needs) rather than from the perspective of the firm's legal expertise (which may or may not be germane to the client's business).

  The latter approach—starting from the perspective of the firm rather than the client—is conceptually just plain mistaken. 

In practice, what does this really mean? 

  • First, as noted, it requires genuine collaboration.  Teams need to be assembled and re-assembled as the client's business and legal posture changes.  Now the team may need some focused litigators; next quarter an offshore tax expert; and the quarter after that an employment maven.  Iris Jones' job is to stay on top of all this and make sure that today's "A Team" doesn't become tomorrow's "Irrelevant Team." 
    Does this mean partners need to "buy in" with their heart and soul?  Check.
    Yes, this can be the hard part:  We all know that collaboration is not in the law school curriculum.  But never underestimate the power of self-interest to trump training.  As one Akin-Gump partner put it:  "In an increasingly competitive environment, the client service team has been invaluable in [strengthening] our relationship."
  • Second, it requires plain old information-tracking.  Call it "Client Relationship Management" if you like, but lawyers must have one centralized repository for everything germane about the client's legal needs and the history of its relationship with the firm.  We've all had the experience of phoning (say) the cable company to ask a service-related question or inquire about a bill, only to find ourselves forced to explain everything from square one with a succession of several different people.  As uninspiring as this is with the cable company, it leaves a positively ghastly impression coming from a supposedly sophisticated law firm.
  • Lastly, it means the client service team has to have a vision of where the client fits within the firm's strategic plan—a vision which is both clear and nuanced.  Lest I be accused of throwing around the phrase "strategic plan" loosely, I'll try to define it:  "Strategic plan" in the sense I mean it is not the 3- or 5-year document delivered from the mountaintop and promptly shelved for terminal verboseness or immediate irrelevancy (the latter fate being nicely described by the epithet "OBE," or "overtaken by events").  Rather, a strategic plan in this sense is a continuously evolving awareness of the fit between (i) the marketplace's specific demands; (ii) the firm's ability (or short-term lack thereof) to meet those demands; and (iii) how the firm can develop to most closely align its capabilities and offerings with the evolving market.

Note the focus throughout is on "the clienit" and "the market" rather than "the firm" or "the lawyer."

We have all known in our heads for some time, even if we have not acted on it with our hearts, that excellent legal skills are merely the price of admission in today's globally competitive market.  That means they cannot pretend to be your distinctive calling card; they're table stakes.

What could provide an enduring distinction, on the other hand, is responding to your clients' business (and, as a follow-on thereto, legal) needs with the same alacrity and professional focus the client itself would apply internally.  Client service teams may not be the only route there, but they surely start at the right end of the service spectrum.

"Blawg Review #39" will be hosted right here at "Adam Smith, Esq." this coming Monday, January 9th.   If you're not familiar with the concept, Blawg Review is the legal blogosphere's iteration of what's becoming a happy, entertaining, and valuable custom among the digerati:  Creating a weekly digest of some of the "best of" posts of that week in whatever specific topical area is in question.

Many of the weekly topical digests are called "Carnival of the [insert topic here]" for reasons now lost in the mists of internets past.  One of my favorites, which will surprise no one, is "Carnival of the Capitalists."

So I'm asking for reader participation. 

  • Legal bloggers:  Send me a link to what you consider one of your smartest, sassiest posts of this week.
  • Loyal readers:  Send me a link to posts from your travels in the legal blogosphere that you either think I ought to see, wish you had written, or both.

And thanks in advance to one and all for checking out Blawg Review #39 this coming Monday.

In case you haven't seen the home-page of Law.com today, they are launching their "Career Center":

Law.com Home Page 4 Jan 2006

And this is the article that I'm up there, as it were, alluding to.

Improve on your weaknesses or build on your strengths:  Which one would you focus on to achieve greater success?

If, like 59% of people surveyed by Marcus Buckingham, co-author of First, Break All the Rules, you chose "work on your weaknesses," you're wasting your time, says Buckingham.  At best, focusing a critical eye on your weaknesses might help prevent failure; but it will never help you attain excellence.

More importantly, the same goes, in spades, for people you manage.  What makes a great manager? 

  • The ability to find, and then capitalize upon, employee's unique traits.
  • The knack for finding an employee's talent and turning it into performance.
  • Playing "chess, not checkers"—knowing that employees work differently and have different "moves."
  • In short, knowing that you don't have a dozen associates working for you; you have a dozen individuals.

What exactly are an employee's, or an associate's, "strengths and talents?"  Actually, it's not a metaphysical question; it's an empirical exercise.  What are they good at?  What do they seem to enjoy?  What do they learn quickly?  What assignments do they feel are intrinsically rewarding?   Give them more of those things, and less of other things; in other words, capitalize on their natural proclivities.  Swim downstream, not upstream.

How intuitively sensible is this?  Plenty:  Haven't you experienced in your own career the sense that at times you were shadowboxing with cotton wool?  That you couldn't get traction, couldn't be effective, couldn't figure out what you were doing wrong, and at some point didn't even want to know?  (If you've never been there, would you kindly email me the special recipe for your coffee in the morning?)  But at other times you've been in the flow, challenged but not overwhelmed, engaged but not enervated, learning but not struggling. 

Assume others are no different.   As a gross generalization, litigators and deal lawyers have different personality types.   Forcibly transplanting an individual who has found his  niche from one practice to the other will almost surely be an excursion into the veil of tears.

Taking matters a step further, what distinguishes a manager from a leader? 

Let's grant that leaders are fundamentally different than managers.  Buckingham believes the key distinction is that leaders:

  • are focused on the future, not the present
  • are almost maniacally, unshakably optimistic
  • have tremendous confidence in their own suitability for the role as leader, and
  • rally people behind a "universal truth."

The "universal truth" must be embraced, above all, with pellucid clarity

So, for example, when Rudy Giuliani assumed the mayoralty of the famously ungovernable New York City in 1993, he did not attack problems with the schools and the parks and the municipal unions and crime and the budget, although any and all of these were certainly deserving of SWAT-team interventions:  He focused on reducing crime and improving the overall quality of life by starting with a crackdown on almost perversely minor offenses, from turnstile-jumping and graffiti in the subways to "squeegee men" in the streets. 

And Giuliani consistently tied it all back to a vision of a future New York City—a safe, clean, civilized one.

As Buckingham puts it:  "When you want to lead, start with the future.  Get specific. And get vivid."

As of this morning, there's a noteworthy new kid on the legal blogosphere block: "The Wall Street Journal Online, Esq."

Well, not quite—actually, they're calling it simply their "Law Page," but a "centerpiece" of their new coverage is their new Law Blog.  Grab the feed.

Who's behind this?:

"We've beefed up our legal team with two great journalists: Ashby Jones, our legal editor, was a reporter at The Deal and American Lawyer Media. A former litigator and clerk to a federal judge, Ashby is a graduate of Haverford College and the University of Michigan Law School. He'll be writing The FLaw column.

"Peter Lattman will be writing our law blog. Peter joined the Online Journal from Forbes Magazine. Before becoming a journalist, he was a litigator at a law firm and worked on Wall Street. He is a graduate of Harvard University and Fordham University Law School. The blog will also include contributions from reporters at The Wall Street Journal and Dow Jones Newswires."

A heartfelt "Welcome" to the blawgosphere is in order!   And you thought blogging was going to turn out to be a fad....

What are your New Year's resolutions?  And, of greater interest, what makes you think you might really observe them?

Let's take a step back:  Isn't there something fundamentally irrational about New Year's resolutions to begin with?  After all, if you want to start running five miles a day, getting to work earlier, or cutting out the cheesecake, you shouldn't wait until January 1st to start.

Prof. Thomas Schelling, this year's Nobel prize-winner in economics for his work on conflict, has something to tell us about this:  He's written at some length about the archetypal situation in which a "resolution" may come in handy to change your actual behavior.  He posits a divided self:  One part of us wants to stop smoking, the other part wants to reach for the cigarette after dinner.  One part of us wants to get up earlier, the other part wants to hit the snooze button.  So far, so familiar.

The insight he adds is that these two parts of ourselves exist at different times.  The Angel Part is in control before the decision is actually made; the Devil Part takes over at the moment of truth.  So the question becomes:  Are there tools/techniques/strategies we can employ to strengthen the Angel's ability to constrain the Devil when push comes to shove?  There are some.

  • The very fact that you have made A Formal (Written, I hope) Resolution raises the price of non-compliance; if you've also made the commitment public with a spouse or loved one, posted it on the refrigerator and above your desk, so much the better.  Shame doesn't always trump temptation, but you can give it a fighting chance.
  • Make bright-line rules, not vague incantations of improvement.  So:  Rather than "eat less," specify "zero carbs."  Rather than "only one cigarette after a meal" (what exactly is a "meal" in today's grazing/snacking society?), "one cigarette only at 1pm and 7pm."
  • Physically remove temptation:  If you have to go out to buy dessert, the Angel may have time to reassert control, but had it been ready to hand in the freezer, the Devil starts out on top.
  • Bargain with yourself and promise a reward for the pain inflicted by compliance with the Resolution:  If you lose 10 pounds, you can buy a new dress.  Just make sure the incentive is something you really want; make it meaningful, so that its loss would be painful.

So what are my New Year's Resolutions? 

  • To connect with more readers of "Adam Smith, Esq." in the real, off-line world—one of the greatest rewards of this site, to me.
  • To try to make "Adam Smith, Esq." ever more insightful, carefully reasoned, and just plain intrinsically interesting.  And
  • To celebrate everyone's entitlement to one vice of their choosing.

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