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Monday 6 September, 2010
January 2006 Archives
If that call came in to your firm tomorrow morning,
where would it go?
If the answer is, "anyone's guess," and if you consider
your firm "a player," you have some work to do.
Consider that at last week's Davos meeting of the
"World Economic
Forum," one of the more outspoken hedge fund
managers asked, "Why
can buyout firms take public companies private and
make enormous returns, while the same type of returns
seem out of reach
for public companies and their shareholders?" While
the reasons for private companies to outperform their
public brethren are extremely complex, not to mention
hotly disputed, the market today (meaning the people
who have billions at their disposal to invest) believe
it so, and are acting accordingly.
Just listen to The Wall Street Journal's
year-end wrapup (for 2005, emphasis supplied):
"It was the biggest year for mergers and
acquisitions since 2000, with $2.9 trillion in announced
deals, up 38% from a year ago, according to research
firm Dealogic. The list included Procter & Gamble's
$60.8 billion buy of Gillette [...]
Dealing was also brisk in the technology sector,
led by the $11.4 billion private-equity buyout of SunGard
Data Systems.... Private-equity
firms racked up a record year, with $493.8 billion
in deals, or 17% of total global volume. Nine of the
10 biggest private-equity deals on record happened
this year,
according to Dealogic, including the $15.3 billion
buyout of Danish telecommunications firm TDC by Kohlberg
Kravis Roberts, Apax Partners and others and the $15
billion buyout of Hertz by Clayton Dubilier & Rice,
Carlyle and Merrill Lynch Global Private Equity.
Look
for more of the same next year, with private-equity
acquirers hunting in packs, making bigger deals possible."
No kidding about the deals getting bigger: "With
some private equity funds raising as much as $10 billion,
the conversation has turned to whether there will be
a day when a $100 billion fund arrives, fundamentally
changing the landscape between public and private businesses."
But
isn't there a limit to how large a fish private
equity can swallow and still create the out-sized market
returns they've enjoyed so far? To the contrary: Some
of the smartest money is betting that "the next
big opportunities [are] not in small companies but in
big companies, where the inefficiencies are writ large.
As one big private equity investor said, "The
bigger the company, the better chance it is badly managed.""
O'Melveny & Myers chimes in: "The buyout
funds are red-hot, having reached unprecedented sizes."
So which law firms are getting the lion's share of
this business? According to Bowne,
in North America last year the leader in buyout transaction
volume (number of deals) was Kirkland & Ellis (31)
and the leader in total value of deals was Simpson-Thacher
at just shy of $16-billion. Other familiar names
included Weil-Gotshal, O'Melveny & Myers, Latham, Cleary-Gottlieb,
and Ropes & Gray. In Europe, meanwhile,
the volume leaders are Linklaters, Clifford Chance,
and Lovells, with 65 deals between them, and in value,
Clifford Chance is #1 at nearly €19-billion,
followed by Freshfields at €11.5-billion. US
firms include the usual suspects: Weil-Gotshal,
Cleary, White & Case, Willkie-Farr, and Shearman and
Sterling also make respectable showings, solidly in
the top ten in terms of deal value.
So my point would be?
Be nimble, be flexible, above all be aware of
macroeconomic developments. Lucrative practice
areas do not materialize out of thin air; they are
the creatures of capital flows around the country and
around the world. Five years ago hedge funds
and private equity were relatively somnolent, certainly
in the public's eyes and even in the eyes of relative
financial sophisticates.
The world changes, and the composition of its demand
for top-of-the-pyramid legal services changes in sync. Incumbents
at the top today have no inalienable right to their
privileged status. On what more optimistic
and energizing note could you conceivably begin your
week?
David Maister confesses:
"I have spent twenty years trying to say
all professions look similar and can learn from each
other, but I’m finally prepared to concede that lawyers
are different – and it has nothing to do with economics."
In a piece titled "Warlords and Dickensian Factory
Owners," David compares the modern day law firm to
both feudal peasants terrorized by the warlord into
paying tribute, and the Dickensian factory
where you can, in fact, make an awful lot of money
if you work people to the bone, slash costs, and have
a heart of stone at the mere mention of phrases like
"work/life balance."
Partners defend this approach by appeal to economic
necessity in the short run: "If we don't keep
PPP up, we'll lose our rainmakers and the firm will
be devastated."
Doesn't this fly in the face of what by now are mountains
of research showing that genuinely engaged and energized
employees, sharing a firm-wide vision, are the strongest
driver of profitability known to management science? Yes,
it does: But it takes years of consistent vision,
and action, to get to that point. What's worse,
none of the energy expended in creating that environment
shows any financial return until, essentially, the
environment has been transformed. Wall Street's,
or your partners', insistence on performance this
quarter is hard to square with that time-consuming
and uncertain investment.
This is also where "lawyers
are different" comes
in. Consider that lawyers are socialized
unlike members of any other profession or followers
of any other discipline:
"Martin Seligman [writes] in his book
AUTHENTIC HAPPINESS: “Lawyers
are trained to be aggressive, judgmental, intellectual,
analytical and emotionally detached. This produces
predictable emotional consequences…he or she will be
depressed, anxious and angry a lot of the timeâ€."
Or, consider a psychographic test measuring "sociability,"
with the median American defined as scoring 50 on a 1—100
scale: Lawyers' mean score was 8. Put 250
Type A's with that personality profile in charge of a
$100+ million/year enterprise, and you should not expect
a touchy-feely environment to spontaneously emerge.
But we're serious here, folks.
Is the only way to create a high-performance organization
to yell, chastise, berate, intimidate, and generally
treat your "colleagues" as enemy aliens? It
is most assuredly not the only way;
but it has an indisputable track record of being a way. And,
not to discount its attractions, it has the virtues
of simplicity, directness, and economy of action. As
everyone from NFL coaches to Parris Island drill sergeants
would testify, it dispenses with the need to painstakingly
psychoanalyze what subtle combination of persuasive
buttons need to be pushed—in different combinations
for each person, of course—to motivate your troops.
I will further grant there are times and places where
peremptory and unilateral emergency injunctions are
called for: Maister
uses the examples of a combat
unit or a small child nearing a hot stove. But these
are surely far removed from towers in Manhattan's canyons.
But back to the short-term pressure cooker vs. the
longer-term vision needed to escape this inhumane
behavior pattern.
In Practice
What You Preach, Maister reports the results
of a survey of 6,500 people in 139 offices of 29 firms
in 15 countries, which demonstrates conclusively (to
me at least), that employee attitudes drive profitability,
and not the other way around. What "attitudes"
would those be, precisely?
- A palpable sense of engagement is
number one. Are people "turned on" by coming
to work? Can they tell you, without prompting
and in a convincing fashion, what the firm stands
for?
If this describes your firm, congratulations! (And
I'm available for interviews.) But skeptical
responses to the call for such a vision, in places
where it doesn't exist, are far easier to come by:
- We don't have the luxury of thinking long-run.
- Not everyone can be engaged, or wants to be; some
just want to put in their time and get paid.
- Whatever time we spend trying to move the firm
in that direction is time not spent developing new
clients and billing hours.
- ...and you can fill out the list.
And lest you think I'm casting aspersions on people
who think that way, or that I believe it's only partners
who have these attitudes, let me hasten to add that these
attitudes are understandable, they're
not intrinsically abusive, and clients and associates
often feel very similarly, albeit from their own perspectives.
Associates can feel that they're only in it to pay
off their law school loans, or to get enough experience
to be able to credibly interview for inhouse positions. Clients,
increasingly, issue RFP's and sponsor "beauty pageants"
before awarding work; institutional relationships of
longstanding are increasingly rare. And to firms
that do win work from sophisticated clients: Be
careful what you wish for! Requests for discounts,
volume billing, and Procrustean itemization of activities
and expenses (the better to micromanage their costs)
are on the way.
Can any of this be changed? Can we, in fact,
ever get back to the days of longer-term thinking,
and a willingness to invest both time and money to
build an enduring firm with a distinctive identity? Maister
is pessimistic:
"I’ve tried logic. It hasn’t worked
well on non-believers. I’ve tried presenting conclusive
data. It hasn’t worked well on non-believers. I’ve
tried appealing to matters of principle, standards,
values, and meaning. It hasn’t worked well on non-believers.
"I no longer believe people can be “converted†on
this topic."
For those still willing to try, because the cause is
as worthy as they come, try these steps on the road to
change:
- Ignore the skeptics; you'll never win them over
anyway.
- Start with the believers, and talk to their needs.
- Enlist allies.
- Celebrate small wins.
- Spread the word.
- Win a few more.
- Keep telling the story.
- Welcome the converted fence-sitters who decide
you must be doing something right.
- And keep telling the
story.
Questions for your managing partner, executive committee,
and executive director:
Is your firm as profitable as it could be? How
does it measure up vis-a-vis its peer group? And
what defines that "peer group," precisely? Do
you ever wonder what you could do to improve its margins? Structurally
or strategically, precisely what would that entail?
If you're reasonably typical, the answers are:
- In all honesty, probably not
- I'd rather not comment
- Uuuuh, instinct; we know them when we see them
- All the time
- If I knew, I'd change my answers to #1 and #4
The rest of what you're about to read won't answer
those questions, certainly not in any glib and snappy
way, but read on if you'd like to learn about some
ground-breaking empirical research into the structure
and profitability levels of the AmLaw 200.
What follows is a highly selective and distilled excerpt
of and extrapolation from a paper forthcoming in the
University of North Carolina Law Review (84 N.C. L.
Rev. __ (2006), draft version available at SSRN),
by my good friend Prof. William Henderson of
Indiana University Law School at Bloomington.
The paper is titled "An Empirical Analysis of
Single-Tier vs. Two-Tier Partnership in the AmLaw 200," and
among a host of other fascinating findings is the creation
of a statistical model attempting to explain the level
of Profits per Partner (the "dependent variable," in
statistics-land) based on an extremely limited number
of quantifiable factors (the "independent variables").
If you were creating such a model, what would you
nominate for your universe of independent variables? What,
in other words, drives PPP—what is most relevant
and determinative?
Brainstorm for a moment. [...]
Time's up.
- Leverage? Defined strictly as [total # of
lawyers/# of equity partners]. Yes;
it's in the regression analysis, although with a
counter-intuitive and surprising caveat.
- Average billable hours per lawyer? Yes again. (That
was an easy one.)
- Whether the firm switched to a two-tier model in
the past decade in order to boost reported PPP? Sorry.
- "Prestige" of the firm, based on annual Vault and American
Lawyer surveys? Yes again.
- Size of firm? Bzzzz; nope.
- How about "associate satisfaction," as
measured annually the The American Lawyer,
which tracks such measures as open-ness about firm
finances, candor about prospects for partner, and
a firm's commitment to professional development? Yes;
but see my remark about leverage.
- Percentage of lawyers who are in New York? Yes—so
let's hear it for the home town.
- Composition of practice areas? Not in the
equation, partly because it's not readily quantifiable.
This leaves us with five independent variables:
- Leverage
- Average hours billed
- Prestige
- Associate satisfaction, and
- % of lawyers in NYC
Together, these five variables explain three-quarters (74.2%)
of firms' profitability:

So relatively "immutable" factors, at
least in the short to medium term, account
for all but 26% of the size of the average AmLaw 200
firm's bottom line in terms of PPP; the most enlightened
or brilliant management in the world (plus our fair-
and foul-weather friend, luck) affect only one-quarter
of the average AmLaw 200 firm's results.
We can say more: Being above the regression
line means your firm is outperforming expectations;
being below it, the converse. Out of a sense
of charity, Bill did not identify any firms below the
line by name (although if you contact me directly,
we can talk...). On the other hand, some of the
firms identified above the line enjoy particular circumstances
that explain their unusual performance. I'll
select a few from the top right down (I know it's hard
to read, but I have a larger copy):
- Cahill-Gordon: An outsized presence in junk-bond
issuance, plus a notoriously tight-fisted cost control
culture.
- Simpson-Thacher and Davis-Polk: Unbeatable
prestige, making them law-firm-land's equivalent
of "bulge bracket" investment banks.
- Kirkland & Ellis: The go-to brand in
high stakes litigation, especially antitrust. (And
an unusually canny twist on the two-tier partnership
model, which I'll discuss another day.)
- Gibson-Dunn: Supreme Court practice.
You get the idea: It is extremely difficult
to establish, or sustain, a position "above the line."
The good news is it's less difficult, given enough
time and a consistent strategic approach, to move up
the line. To move up the line, you
dial in changes in those famous independent variables: Leverage,
% of our lawyers in NYC, average billable hours, prestige, and
associate satisfaction.
For which of those do you get the biggest bang for
the buck? Back to our friend, the regression
analysis. The following table displays the value,
in annual profits per partner, of a one-unit increase
in each of our variables. A few explanations
and caveats first: Remember first and foremost
that these are values derived from the entire universe
of AmLaw 200 firms. As they say, "your mileage
may vary."
Second, the meaning of a "one-unit
increase" depends on which variable you're talking
about. A one-unit increase in the leverage ratio,
or the average number of hours billed, is fairly self-evident,
but a "one unit" increase in prestige, and in associates'
likelihood of staying for the next two years, reflect
the subjective scales on which they were measured. For
"prestige," Vault uses a 10-point
scale. (For example, in 2003, Cravath and Wachtell
each scored a stratospheric 8.93, Davis-Polk 8.12,
and Simpson-Thacher 7.78.) For "likelihood of
staying," The American Lawyer used a
5-point scale. Finally, for "% NYC/Global," Bill
simply divided the AmLaw 200 into four roughly equal
cohorts: 0%; < 10%, 10—50%, and > 50%. Jumping
from one cohort to the next one above is our "unit"
increase.
The envelope, please:
Variable |
Single-Tier Firms |
Two-Tier Firms |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
[not statistically significant]
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The more you think about these numbers (at least if
you're like me), the less surprising they are—except
for the third row. This says, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that for two-tier firms, the more likely associates
judge they will be to stay two years, the less profitable
the firm: And you're
taking it in the teeth. A one-unit increase in
associate satisfactions costs you a cool quarter of
a million dollars a year. What on earth is going
on here?
I have my own theories, which I'll discuss, again,
another day. Suffice for now for me to toss out
this (I hope) pregnant thought: Paraphrasing
Tolstoy, "all single tier firms are alike; each two-tier
firm is two-tier in its own way." Single-tier
land is a flat, homogeneous landscape. Two-tier
land is heterogeneous geography, full of recently thrust-up
peaks and cleaved valleys.
Have no fear that "Adam Smith, Esq." is going to morph into a
boot-licking, reverential conduit for re-distributing
the year-end natterings of those ink-stained
scribes from the MSM and the high-profile consultancies
hoping to goose their annual bonus by producing yet
another "ten trends..." or such-like: The predictions
tend to the bullet-proof, in that they flunk the fundamental
tenet of vector analysis, which is that to fully specify
the characteristics of a vector one must define it
in all four dimensions (the fourth being time, or with
objects in motion, speed). "X is going to increase/decrease/start/stop,"
but omitted is where, when, or how fast.
(And lest you think I harbor a secret intellectual temptation
to indulge in potentially-entertaining year-end prognostication
myself, take a look at David
Maister's comment to an
earlier post:
"With no disrespect to any law or consulting firm named
here, I am deeply skeptical about all this. In the
past, when asked to talk about the "Trends in the Profession" I
used to use a 10-year-old slide which referred to no
specific profession or country. Everyone fell for it
- they all agreed that, yes these are the trends we
will have to face.")
Nevertheless, sometimes consensus surveys are used to extrapolate
trends, and they have value if only for the snapshot
they provide of the common wisdom at a point in time.
Consider, then, CIO Insight's year-end survey of nearly
6,000 CIO's and CTO's (64%) and other top executives
(36%), which generated no fewer than thirty "trends."
A prefatory note: The results of some of the non-trend-generating
questions are intrinsicially interesting. Two of the
more hopeful: #1: "Our research also indicates that
companies are giving more employees access to business
intelligence tools, in hopes they apply the insights
those systems generate." Knowledge is power; distribute
power lest it corrupt. And #2: 78% of companies plan
to increase profits through growth, not cost reduction.
Gordon Bethune, the legendary former turn-around CEO
of Continental Airlines, like to make the latter point
with his pizza analogy: "The biggest cost component
of a pizza is the cheese; if you're serious about cutting
costs, eliminate the cheese."
Off, then, to the trends. And don't worry; I've narrowed
their thirty down to four of note to us:
-
Trend 7: The Hunger for Analysis
and Intelligence Will Keep Growing: By this,
they mean "Business Intelligence," and specifically
what I've
called the second generation of "BI:"
"Already, mid-level managers and planning staff use
BI tools at 61 percent of companies. [...] This widening
use of ever more powerful analytical tools has enormous
potential for the future. But the extent to which that
potential is met will depend on how well the BI system
connects to strategy and user needs."
- Trend 22: IT Architecture Becomes Critical to Business
Strategy: "What once appeared arcane will become
more and more central. As high-growth companies have
figured out, IT architecture and infrastructure have
never been so closely tied to corporate strategy as
they are today. It doesn't matter whether CIOs are
trying to achieve faster growth, better business processes,
lower costs or global expansion." In other
words, the basic "hygiene" of your information systems
has to be rock-solid. (1) Secure, reliable data
(2) shared across all your offices and employees (3)
on a common platform.
- Trend 24: Data Integration Is the Technology Pressure
Point: "Data quality will go from nice-to-have
to need-to-have. Flexibility and openness remain nothing
but talk, while standardization and virtualization
remain useless, unless companies can reliably integrate
their systems and ensure the quality of their data." It's
not just your corporate clients struggling with Sarbanes-Oxley
that have to get their "data" squeaky-clean; it's your
own firm as well. Don't your clients have every
right to expect you can and do handle your own data
with the utmost scrupulousness?
- Trend 27: Knowledge Management Regains Respect: Isn't
this the perennial whipping boy, the classic example
of the "evergreen" prediction? (My
favorite is, "Brazil will lead the way the next
decade,"
which we've been hearing since before Sputnik.) But
listen to what CIO Insight has to say at
some length about KM (emphasis supplied):
"CIOs haven't given
up on its promise. Knowledge management has long
suffered a bad rap as a sexy technology that falls
short on delivering business value. But for two
years in a row, KM has ranked a respectable 7th
on our list of critical technologies. (Twenty-one
technologies were ranked on this list in 2005.)
This is happening in part because many
of the technologies that fall under the aegis of
KM have come into their own: collaboration tools, corporate portals,
content management and business intelligence.
"These technologies aren't mere repositories for
knowledge, as earlier KM systems tended to be.
They route knowledge to the
people who need it,
or embed what the company has learned into a process.
As companies find these knowledge-managing technologies
helpful, they'll look for new, effective ways to
manage corporate know-how and put it to work."
I would be the last person to tell you that KM is
easy, and I'm both unsurprised and essentially unperturbed
that it's taking us so long to get it right. We
are, after all, dealing in some cases with "knowledge"
that is so contextual and nuanced as to be almost ineffable. And
it's not just those at the peak of the empyrean professions: Consider
the story in today's WSJ of the technology
columnist trying to make polite conversation with a
FedEx guy in a high-rise office elevator. WSJ
Guy: "So, is it quicker to work top to bottom
or bottom to top?" FedEx Guy (dead
serious): "It depends on the time of day."
Put that in a database!
Two new blogs of note:
- David Maister's "Passion,
People and Principles": I
sincerely hope you
recognize David's name; if you don't, I implore you
to take an immediate look. His inaugural post is about
his "blogging
philosophy."
- "Truth
on the Market," a joint blog with two "founders" and
four "authors," each smarter than the last, and
all law professors (at different schools) with
a severe penchant for economics. Any
commonality among them? They seem to over-index
on having gone to Chicago Law School, clerked for
prominent federal appellate judges (Posner, anyone?),
and done a tour at Latham & Watkins.
Henceforth, you'll be able to find them on the "Adam
Smith, Esq." blogroll.
As I've written before,
"Business Intelligence" is here
to stay. (And if that's an unfamiliar or unclear term to
you, please refer to the earlier post on this, which serves
to introduce the field; and no apologies necessary, as
the term "BI" is almost perversely non-intuitive to the
newcomer. It only makes sense once one already knows what
it means.)
BI 101 to launch this piece: BI is not to be confused
with "competitive intelligence," which is all about how
your firm is perceived in the marketplace vis-a-vis its
competition, and about what the competition is up to—both
current and potential competition. BI, rather, is about analyzing
the tremendous amounts of raw data spewed out by your firm's various
systems. CIO Magazine defines it thus:
"But with Hillman Group's new BI system, curious business
executives can query the system themselves and get instant answers
about such critical questions as the number of unfilled customer
orders, which is tracked by the system in real-time.
"There's just one problem.
"The new system hasn't made the business better—at
least not yet—only better
informed.
That's generally the problem with BI, the umbrella term that refers to
a variety of software applications used to analyze an organization's raw
data (sales transactions, for example) and extract useful insights from
it. Most CIOs still think of it as a reporting and decision support tool."
The CIO case study involves a computer sub-systems manufacturer
and a chemical company, but the key realities of BI come
through loud and clear: (1) information is power, so
your firm has to be prepared to share that; and (2) knowing
that some of your partners manage things better than others
cannot be seen as threatening, it must be seen as empowering. The goal is not to rap the poor manager's knuckles, but to show by example how he can emulate the good manager.
In
law-firm land, BI can analyze the profitability of entire
practice groups, of offices, of clients, of individual
lawyers, and of individual matters. Of far greater importance
than its ability to write a new gloss on historical experience
is its ability to capture "best
practices" and,
if sensitively and astutely managed, to spread those best
practices across the firm. Who's doing BI? Firms such
as Alston & Bird,
Bryan-Cave, and Goodwin-Procter, which I cite for reasons
that will become clearer below, but permit me to seed your
thinking by observing that all three of these firms place
a noteworthy premium on "cultural" considerations. (A&B,
for one, has not landed above all other law firms on Fortune's
"Best 100 Places to Work" a few years in a row by accident.)
The key to "second generation" BI is to conceive of it as more
than a historical-reporting tool and begin to use it actively
as a way to understand how you can do what you're already
doing in better ways. The management literature calls this
"best practices" or "process management," but don't let
the terms glaze your eyes over. CIO Magazine, with
its understandable CIO-centric perspective, puts it thus:
"Companies that use BI to uncover flawed business processes
are in a much better position to successfully compete
than those companies that use BI merely to monitor what's happening.
Indeed, CIOs who don't use BI to transform business operations
put their companies at a disadvantage. For CIOs who have carried
out this difficult strategy successfully, there is no looking back."
Or, in plain English: If you use BI as a rear-view mirror merely
to point with delight and view with disdain, don't bother. Instead,
use BI to help you understand, at a fairly profound managerial
level, why, for example, two different matters that appeared
superficially similar generated remarkably different
levels of revenue and profitability for the firm—and how to
make the laggard look a lot more like the leader next
time around.
Next point: Does this have to do with technology? Sure,
and so does time-keeping. The technology behind BI, in
other words, should matter not to you. BI is 1% technology
and 99% culture. BI
can improve matter management, client satisfaction,
and even professional development (by identifying,
for example, associates whose write off rates are especially
high or low). These are things your firm must care about. (Did
I forget to mention profitability?)
As a friend of
mine with no little experience in BI implementations
in law firms likes to say, BI will only have an impact
if your firm has "the
will to act." Do you?
Total world cross-border trade as a percentage of global
GDP
1990: 18%
2015 (estimated): 30%
Computational capability of an Intel processor, as measured
in instructions per second
1971: 60,000
2005: 10,800,000,000
Multiple by which e-mail traffic has grown from 1997
to 2005: 215
Number of US tax returns prepared in India
2003: 25,000
2005: 400,000
Do I have your attention?
My point is a simple, if oft-neglected, one: "No firm
is an island," and enormous macroeconomic, social,
and business trends will affect how you do business,
and what business you do. Warren Buffett is fond of saying
that "bad industries trump good management:" If
so, how do you know you will still be in a "good industry"
10 or 15 years hence?
This is where global strategic scenario planning comes in.
As previously
noted, Clifford Chance engaged in just such
an exercise late
last year. With the help of Oxford
Analytica, CC's worldwide managing partner Peter Cornell and his management team were
able to re-conceive the firm's strategic direction
by focusing on the three scenarios Oxford Analytica
built:
- China being removed as an economic opportunity thanks to
their invasion of Taiwan, prompting economic isolation;
- The US becoming fed up with its foreign adventures
and withdrawing into isolationism; and
- Instead of globalisation, the world regresses “back
to the future” — countries and continents
become separate and protectionist. For instance,
America and Europe construct trade barriers
to block cheap imports from China and India.
As both The
Lawyer and the Sunday Times noted,
none of these scenarios is supposed to be "right,"
in the sense of being an accurate prediction of what
will actually come true. What, then, is the point? The
point, which could scarcely be larger, is to have
the firm's leaders think deeply about whether its
strategy is aligned with where the world might be
going. If "change is the only constant," you
cannot foretell the future by linearly extrapolating
3—7%
compound annual growth (let's say) in revenue, headcount,
and profits: More
fundamental shifts are surely in store.
Or, as
Cornell put
it, the world is dynamic:
"Cornell told The Lawyer: "So
many strategic reviews are done in a static environment, but
we have to get used to doing them in a dynamic environment."
"The review also underlines Clifford Chance's shift
away from practice area groups to a more geographical
focus."
Chiming in, from the Times:
"Already the law firm plans to implement
a change in its corporate strategy. From now on, strategy
will be be less practice-based and more geographically
focused. In other words, instead of seeing its divisions
as, say, banking, energy or commodity practices, it will
think in terms of China, North America or Latin America
in future."
But wait a minute, whence this focus on geography?
Aren't we supposed to be focused on clients, which means
industries, which means practice specialties?
Clifford Chance may be right after all, at least if you believe
McKinsey's "Ten
Trends to Watch." Trend #1, extrapolating ten
years hence, is:
"Centers of economic activity will shift profoundly,
not just globally, but also regionally. As a consequence
of economic liberalization, technological advances, capital
market developments, and demographic shifts, the world has
embarked on a massive realignment of economic activity."
Sounds like geography matters.
What else does McKinsey think we need to factor into our strategic
planning? Most germane to law firms:
-
"In many industries, a barbell-like
structure is appearing, with a
few giants on top, a narrow middle,
and then a flourish of smaller,
fast-moving players on the bottom." Hmmm,
sound like any industry we're familiar with?
- As firms become bigger and more far-flung, "Long
gone is the day of the "gut instinct" management
style. Today's business leaders are adopting algorithmic
decision-making techniques and using highly sophisticated
software to run their organizations. Scientific
management is moving from a skill that creates competitive
advantage to an ante that gives companies the right
to play the game." This means you need
to pay serious attention to "business intelligence"
software, for starters. Its effective deployment
across your firm will indeed become table stakes—I
assume only that your partners care about profit levels.
Thinking long and hard about these potential (and, I would
argue, highly likely) developments, as McKinsey puts
it drily, "will be time well spent." Clifford
Chance is there: When will your firm be?
I'm on the New York State Bar Association's "Committee on
Law Practice Management" and, for the record, I wanted
to invite all and sundry who might be in the New York
area to our annual meeting Thursday, January 26, 2006,
from 1:00—5:00 pm at the Marriott Marquis in Times Square (1535 Broadway
@ 45th Street, 7th floor; and I expressly disclaim any responsibility for
the selection of venue).
This year the program is titled: "In
Case of Emergency: Emergency Planning and
Disaster Recovery for the Law Firm
Everyone Needs a Plan," and will address that issue from
the perspectives of human resources, finance, records, IT,
and physical facilities. More info here.
Seventeen years before The Wealth of Nations (1776), Adam
Smith published his Theory
of Moral Sentiments (1759),
nowadays a relatively neglected work which, to my mind, is
nearly as astute, deserves far greater current recognition,
and which not-incidentally puts pad once and for all to any
charge that Adam Smith was unsympathetic to human nature or cavalier
about the consequences of his theories for individuals. Merely
contemplate the book's very first sentence if you doubt me:
"How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently
some principles in his nature, which interest him in the
fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him,
though he derives nothing from it, except the pleasure of seeing
it."
One reviewer nicely summarized its relationship to Wealth of
Nations as follows: "To truly understand Adam Smith's
economic masterpiece "The Wealth of Nations", one must understand
its moral foundation. Without Smith's essential prequel, "The Theory
of Moral Sentiments", the more famous "Wealth of Nations" can easily
be misunderstood, twisted, or dismissed."
So, to today: Harvard Business School's Working Knowledge has
a
piece positing that the Theory of Moral Sentiments was
the original intellectual precursor to what we all know today
as Behavioral Economics. [The HBS WK article refers enticingly
to the primary source, "Adam Smith, Behavioral Economist," published
in the summer 2005 edition of The Journal of Economic Perspectives, but
the troglodyte JEP keeps its online archives under severe
lockdown—trust me, I tried.]
The premise of the HBS piece, "Adam Smith, Behavioral Economist"
is that Moral Sentiments and Wealth of Nations, which
Smith never sufficiently inter-connected during his own life,
nevertheless together constitute the intellectual foundation
of how human psychology (including incentives, preferences,
risk-aversion, and the endless struggle between immediate
and delayed gratification) affect how people behave in markets: In
other words, Behavioral Economics.
"Smith's two main works—The Wealth of Nations
(WN) and The Theory of Moral Sentiments (TMS)—show him to
be a brilliant economist and arguably a brilliant psychologist,
but he was never fully able to bring the economics and psychology
together."
One of the primary arguments of TMS is that human behavior is
driven by passions—fear, desire, and greed among them—but that
these passions are moderated by an "impartial spectator"
looking out for the individual's long-term interests. And there's
apparently something to the theory: Using it, the Harvard professors
designed a "commitment savings product" for banks in the
Phillipines that required customers to sign a contract prohibiting
them from withdrawing funds until a certain amount of time
had elapsed or a level of principal value had been
achieved. According to them, this "had a large and
significant effect on clients' total savings," resulting in
increased home purchases, educational investments, and small
business-building.
But it's when we come to Smith's bedrock belief, intimated
in the opening sentence above, in the importance of trust,
concern for fairness, and reciprocity, that the linkage
of human psychology to market functioning becomes most
clear. Smith believed that those values become more,
not less, important as markets evolve. For example, with
many of the professions, most assuredly including our
own, clients cannot monitor "quality" in real time—and
the same goes for doctors, auditors, and financial advisors. So
trust and reputation stand in where cold economic calculus
fails.
Likewise with corporations: Shareholders must at a fundamental
level trust management to operate in the shareholders'
interest since the range of variables over which management
has control or influence is far too vast to specify contractually
(and such a hypothetical specification would also be obsolete
the moment it was completed).
Finally, Smith recognized, and placed great value upon, "the aerial
coin of praise," and social and professional
status, as critical motivational ingredients. Reputation
("the aerial coin") is the flip-side of trust; one trusts
those who have earned their blue-chip reputations. And Smith
would have insisted on the most scrupulous care and feeding
of reputation, if for no other reason than the dire consequences
attendant upon its destruction.
More currently, consider this (emphasis supplied, hat tip to Larry
Ribstein):
"The market is capable of levying harsh penalities
[for financial malfeasance] on its own.
Recent evidence comes from Karpoff, Lee and Martin, The
Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books (July 25, 2005). Here’s the
abstract:
"We examine the penalties imposed on all 585 firms that were targeted
by SEC enforcement actions for financial misrepresentation
from 1978-2002. Consistent with the view that penalties
are small, monetary fines were imposed on only 7% of the
firms. A larger fraction, 36%, faced class action lawsuits
from investors. Overall, however, the penalties imposed
on firms through the legal system appear to be small,
as the unconditional mean total of all legal penalties
is only $14.3 million per firm.
"The penalties imposed
by the market, in contrast, are huge. Our point estimate
of the reputational penalty - which we define as the expected
loss in the present value of future cash flows due to
higher contracting and financing costs - is over twelve
times the sum of all penalties imposed through the legal
and regulatory system.
"For each dollar that a firm misleadingly
inflates its market value, on average, it loses this dollar
when its misconduct is revealed, plus an additional $2.47.
Of this additional loss, $0.18 is due to expected
legal penalties and $2.29 is due to lost reputation. This
evidence belies a widespread view that financial misrepresentation
is disciplined lightly. To the contrary, reputational
losses impose substantial penalties for cooking the books."
So next time you're cynically thinking that money is the only
motivator, try putting a price on your reputation; Smith would
have.
Indiana University School
of Law at Bloomington—where my good friend Prof.
William Henderson teaches—will be hosting a symposium
on "The Globalization of the Legal Profession" Friday,
April 6, 2006. I'm pleased to report that I will be one
of the panelists.
On the
agenda:
- Law Firm Strategy in a global world, including "What management
structures are necessary to govern a global law firm with
offices on multiple
continents?"
- Relevance of Geography, including "Are some locations,
based on
longitudinal growth patterns, emerging as truly international
legal cities for firms attempting
to fit the transnational model?" Or, phrased differently,
why are more firms hoisting their flag in New York, London,
and Hong Kong, despite those cities' having among the highest
operating cost structures on the planet?
- Convergence, including: "Can transnational
law firms successfully balance the competing goals of higher
profitability and
professional autonomy? To what extent is the practice of
law, and identity of lawyers, converging
around certain practices and values? If so, are those practices/values
those characteristic of the US
legal profession?
The conference will be
in a somewhat hybrid format, blending the academic with the
practical and hands-on, and all papers and presentations will
subsequently be published.
If anyone is interested in attending, please email me; I can testify
that hospitality at the Law School is of the highest order.
Last week I met the head of Bloomberg's relatively new "Law" initiative,
aimed at putting $1,500/month Bloomberg terminals on the
desks of senior partners and general counsel.
Before I describe what "Bloomberg Law" is about, I invite you
to take
a look at their brand-new offices (between 58th and 59th, Third
and Lex), which are a visual and experiential delight unmatched
since "Star Wars"—with the distinction that these
spaces actually function.
As we all know, Bloomberg is
already The Name Brand in financial intelligence, with over
a quarter of a million subscribers to their core business
and financial market information resources. Bloomberg has
also long since gone
multimedia, with Bloomberg TV and Radio, a suite of magazines
and publishing resources, and, lately, podcasts. So what
does Bloomberg Law offer?:
- a comprehensive set of legal, regulatory, and compliance databases;
- news, both real-time and archival;
- rankings;
- company and biographical information;
- legal research tools; and
- of course, all the rest of Bloomberg's financial news,
data, and analytic applications.
The head of Bloomberg Law, Constantin Cotzias (a Brit who practiced
at Denton Wilde Sapte and elsewhere) is unapologetic about
the price of the terminals and unabashed about the scope
of Bloomberg Law's ambitions compared to competitive offerings: "Well,
if you want an Audi, you should buy an Audi, but if you want
to go nought-60 in 3 seconds, you really need a Ferrari,
don't you?" So what exactly can this Ferrari do
for you?
For the co-chair of Orrick's New York bankruptcy group, Lorraine
McGowen, it enables her to research
and discover companies
potentially on the brink of financial meltdown, identify
their bondholders and unsecured creditors, and tailor a custom-made
pitch letter drawing from (say) the content of actual loan
agreements retrievable online, as well as more sophisticated
tools such as "relative value" rankings—Bloomberg's
rating of the operational strength of a firm vis-a-vis its peer
group. In keeping with Bloomberg's high-quant-quotient roots,
here are some of the tools available to analyze likelihood
of default:
"Specify whether you want to solve for the Altman Z-score,
the Double Prime Z-score or the Hillegeist Z-score. [Prof.
Edward] Altman [of NYU's Stern School of Business] developed
his original Z-score for manufacturers. The Double Prime
model is more suited to nonmanufacturing companies, while
the Hillegeist formula generates a probability of default
in addition to the Z-score."
Westlaw, this ain't.
For Brandon Becker, co-chair of the securities regulatory practice
at Wilmer-Hale in Washington, it permits him to analyze trading
patterns in a security tick-by-tick and view breaking company
news surrounding those patterns, as well as to see how other
companies in the same industry were trading simultaneously. Armed
with this information, he obviously has a far clearer view
of whether insider trading is something to be concerned about. (Obviously,
the same tools arm both plaintiffs' and defense attorneys.)
I intend to stay in close touch with Constantin; for people who
need bleeding-edge tools, I for one would put my money on
Bloomberg without looking back.
Regular readers will know that I'm a firm subscriber to the Law
of Unintended Consequences, which is also why I try to exercise
consistency in analyzing "dynamic" and not just "static" effects
of a proposal. Clarification: The "static" effect of
Rule X is simply what it says. "Mandate airbags in cars,"
for example. And the static result will be that new cars
will come with airbags.
The "dynamic" effect is how either
people's behavior (most likely) or the pertinent environment
(less likely, but worth consideration) will change as a result
of the new mandate. With all-but-universal airbags, we now
know that drivers perceive the increased margin of safety
as license to drive faster or otherwise less cautiously (knowing
the consequences of an accident have been, on average, reduced)
with the ultimate result that vehicular injury rates remained
essentially unchanged—while accidents produced less
serious injuries, there were more of them.
A second core, or at least default, belief of mine is that Disclosure
Is A Per Se Good. One reason I gravitated to practicing
securities law is that, conceptually at least, I believe
the (US) securities laws can be summed up as follows: "You
have permission to do anything, so long as you fairly
disclose what you're doing." (I will not insert any
editorial commentary here about whether Sarbanes-Oxley graffiti'ed
over that pristine canvas, but will leave it to those who
still do securities
law and commentary for a living.)
Which brings us to the SEC's newly announced initiative to require
complete, thorough-going disclosure of all forms of compensation
to CEO's and other top corporate officers—and to do so, for
a change, all in one place, that place not to be inscrutable
proxy footnotes.
A value will have to be put on everything from stock options
and the use of corporate jets to Metropolitan Opera tickets,
skyboxes, maid service, and the ugly new duckling on the
block, "gross-up's" to pay taxes on all these perks. As The
New York Times' Joseph Nocera puts
it: "All in all,
it's going to be a pretty sickening sight."
And we're talking real money here:
"According to Lucian A. Bebchuk, an executive compensation
expert at Harvard, from 2000 to 2003, the total compensation
of the five best-paid officers of all publicly held companies amounted
to 10 percent of corporate earnings."
Ten percent! You can argue methodology
until the cows come home, but whether it was 8 or whether
it was 12, it is to my mind "highly material." And: Ethically
unconscionable, socially divisive, morally corrosive,
economically indefensible, and (by rights) personally humiliating.
Then again, as Graef Crystal, "grand old man of executive
compensation critics," observes, "it turn[s] out that when somebody
is hauling in $200-million, he's not embarrassable"—even
though the current ratio of CEO pay to that of the average worker
at the same company is 400:1.
Litany of the caveats:
- No one should gainsay true entrepreneurs outlandish wealth: Bill
Gates, Michael Dell, and our own Mayor Mike Bloomberg deserve
everything they've got. We need more of them, not fewer.
- "It's a free country," and some combination of shareholders,
Boards of Directors, and institutional investors could
slam on the brakes; the fact that they have yet to do so
suggests at least as an initial proposition that the
competition for top corporate officers is not a completely
malfunctioning marketplace.
- And most importantly, it is not the job of the SEC, Congress,
Joe Six-Pack, or yours truly to enforce what might be our
own views of decorous behavior on top executives.
Rather than view with alarm (since the facts speak for themselves),
and rather than propose any reforms or remedies (see bullet
#3, supra), my aim is simply to shed some light on how
we got here.
We got here, largely, by trying to shed light on corporate compensation
practices in the first place.
Remember back in 1993 when Congress eliminated the tax-deductibility
of executive salaries in excess of $1-million? Two things
happened: First, this added rocket fuel to the growth of
stock option grants; but second and even more interestingly,
$1-million/year on the W-2, rather than becoming a ceiling,
became the new floor.
I fear we're about to re-run the same movie. Under the new
rules, not only will you and I learn that GE is paying for
Jack Welch's Red Sox tickets, so will every other current
or former CEO. And if history is any guide, anyone in that
club still suffering the indignity of buying MLB tickets
himself will be on the phone to their comp. committee in
about 30 seconds. Full disclosure, meet the law of unintended
consequences.
Now, what has this to do with law firms?
The American Lawyer's profits-per-partner ranking, is
what. At this point in the industry's trajectory, my own
view is that TAL's PPP figures (and all their other financial-performance
metrics) are simply a given. Rightly or wrongly, like them
or loathe them, view them as invasions of privacy or refreshing
beams of sunlight, we are living with them: If you don't
like it, "Get over yourself," as we say in New York.
That does not mean, of course, that they are without consequence. While
the competitive one-upmanship of our friends (and clients)
in the Fortune 500 may be unseemly in the extreme, we are
not immune from jealous glances. Just as corporate compensation
packages will be different before and after mandatory disclosure,
so our profession's compensation structures are not merely
reflected in the inanimate and passive mirror of the TAL figures: Over
time, that mirror profoundly influences the landscape it
takes in.
Your firm is dedicated to client service as one of its pre-eminent
goals, if not the absolutely highest priority, right?
Not so fast. Do you have a lawyer serving full-time as "Client
Services Advisor," serving as an ombudsman on behalf of the firm's
clients and responsible for creating and overseeing more than 60 "client
service teams" (and counting)? Akin-Gump does, in the person
of Iris
Jones.
Swell: What's a "client service team?," you're asking.
Essentially, it's a tool for formalizing and institutionalizing collaboration
among the various lawyers serving Important Client X. An
example will aid understanding even better than a description. Here's
how the "Technology-Copyright-Internet" group works:
"The TCI attorneys participate in client service teams with Akin Gump’s
patent attorneys, litigation attorneys and other practice groups. This
collaborative commitment to client service enables Akin Gump to assist
in providing clients with comprehensive counseling in all areas of
IP and overlapping areas of the law."
The goal is to approach the client relationship from the perspective
of the client's business (and its concomitant legal needs) rather
than from the perspective of the firm's legal expertise (which
may or may not be germane to the client's business).
My friend Bruce Marcus also describes this
approach.
The latter approach—starting from the perspective of
the firm rather than the client—is conceptually just plain mistaken.
In practice, what does this really mean?
- First, as noted, it requires genuine collaboration. Teams
need to be assembled and re-assembled as the client's business and
legal posture changes. Now the team may need some focused litigators;
next quarter an offshore tax expert; and the quarter after that an
employment maven. Iris Jones' job is to stay on top of all
this and make sure that today's "A Team" doesn't become tomorrow's
"Irrelevant Team."
Does this mean partners need to "buy in" with their heart and soul? Check.
Yes, this can be the hard part: We all know that collaboration
is not in the law school curriculum. But never underestimate
the power of self-interest to trump training. As one Akin-Gump
partner put it: "In an increasingly competitive environment,
the client service team has been invaluable in [strengthening] our
relationship."
- Second, it requires plain old information-tracking. Call
it "Client Relationship Management" if you like, but lawyers must
have one centralized repository for everything germane about the
client's legal needs and the history of its relationship with the
firm. We've all had the experience of phoning (say) the cable
company to ask a service-related question or inquire about a bill,
only to find ourselves forced to explain everything from square one
with a succession of several different people. As uninspiring
as this is with the cable company, it leaves a positively ghastly
impression coming from a supposedly sophisticated law firm.
- Lastly, it means the client service team has to have a vision of
where the client fits within the firm's strategic plan—a vision
which is both clear
and nuanced. Lest I be accused of throwing around the phrase
"strategic plan" loosely, I'll try to define it: "Strategic
plan" in the sense I mean it is not the 3-
or 5-year document delivered from the mountaintop and promptly shelved
for terminal verboseness or immediate irrelevancy (the latter fate
being nicely described by the epithet "OBE," or "overtaken by events"). Rather,
a strategic plan in this sense is a continuously evolving awareness
of the fit between (i) the marketplace's specific demands; (ii) the
firm's ability (or short-term lack thereof) to meet those demands;
and (iii) how the firm can develop to most closely align its capabilities
and offerings with the evolving market.
Note the focus throughout is on "the client" and "the market" rather
than "the firm" or "the lawyer."
We have all known in our heads for some time, even if we have not
acted on it with our hearts, that excellent legal skills are merely
the price of admission in today's globally competitive market. That
means they cannot pretend to be your distinctive calling card; they're
table stakes.
What could provide an enduring distinction, on the other hand, is
responding to your clients' business (and, as a follow-on thereto,
legal) needs with the same alacrity and professional focus the client
itself would apply internally. Client service teams may not be
the only route there, but they surely start at the right end of the
service spectrum.
End of an era?
Peter Cornell's decision not to stand for re-election
as global head of Clifford Chance certainly feels that way,
although as we've argued
before, his timing is impeccable.
Now comes an interview with The
Lawyer in which Cornell reprises his five-year tenure
and concludes with some words of advice for his (unchosen)
successor. As regular readers know, I subscribe to
the theory that individuals forge events, not that events
forge individuals, so it's worth pausing to reflect along
with Peter at the transformations he's wrought at Clifford
Chance. (Full
disclosure: I've
met Peter in person and have the utmost respect for him both
as a managing partner and as a human being.)
First, let's review the bidding: When Cornell
took the helm at Clifford Chance in 2001, the firm was, to
say the least, fractious and divided. The
recent merger with (acquisiton of) New York's Rogers & Wells
left the firm over-indexing on its share of nettlesome
and truculent personalities, and the disconnect between Rogers
& Wells legacy eat-what-you-kill compensation system and Clifford
Chance's UK-heritage lockstep was to prove an expensive, irksome,
and distracting mess until pretty much this past year.
Add to that simmering turmoil Clifford Chance's
triumphant-at-the-time swoop in 2002 to gather up many of the
people left on the street in Northern California when Brobeck
imploded—a classic case of buying in at the top—and
Cornell's hands were full. Nor should we forget the
revolt of the Italian partners in 2002, or the infamous leaked
memo from associates about the pressure to produce billable
hours. That episode, perhaps more than any other, encapsulates
the pressures on Cornell, so it deserves extended treatment:
"The associates' memo - dubbed 'Paddinggate' - was
a particularly difficult moment. The memo, which was leaked
onto the internet in October 2002, exposed US associates' morale
as rock bottom. Even more damagingly, it said that pressure
to bill could have led to a situation where bills were being
padded. There has never been any suggestion that this was actually
happening, but the mere mention of it got the world's business
press salivating.
"Arthur Andersen had collapsed just a few months previously,
and The Lawyer has spoken to a series of partners who candidly
say that many felt they were facing something similar. Most
admit that Cornell was admirably calm under extreme pressure.
"
"I appreciated very early that we had to take this seriously," confesses
Cornell. "It didn't matter that it wasn't a real story: this had legs and
could do the firm a lot of damage. We had to close it down.""
So those were the challenges; what is Cornell's legacy? (Understanding,
of course, that there's no such thing as a "legacy" in a people-intensive
and people-driven business; there's only, shall we say, a
platform going forward from which to attract and retain the
right people.)
First of all, Cornell has struck through the Gordian Knot of
lockstep vs. eat-what-you-kill compensation with a partnership-approved
referendum late last year to establish the principle of three
different equity ladders for different global jurisdictions
(reflecting inherent profitability differences), and which also
puts partners on a triennial evaluation cycle, where they can
be "frozen" at their current point-score or moved down and even
accelerated to annual reviews.
Note that this was approved after a 2003 failure to get approval
of another modified-lockstep proposal; so "coming back to
the well" was not risk-averse behavior. Cornell's
reaction to criticism?: "Criticism? It bounces
off me pretty much." Next time you're considering
your own suitability for managing partner, consider this remark.
And the numbers should speak for themselves: CC's PPP
is projected to hit £850,000 this year ($US 1,515,000)
vs. last year's £710,000 ($US 1,265,000).
But
ultimately, the question of interest is how did Cornell go
about achieving what he did?
It comes down to people.
"Cornell still seems most comfortable talking about
the intangibles. If anything, he seems a natural senior partner
rather than a managing partner. Not for him the sliderule
approach to cost per lawyer and profit margin; rather, he
prefers to talk about whether the partnership is… well… happy."
Care to dimensionalize this? "In a one-on-one situation he's very good," says one partner. "He doesn't get into details. He usually finds something of interest to you and you'll feel good about having the conversation. Pete's style is to absorb other people's views and not to indicate a view of his own."
How many times do we pay obeisance to the bromide that ours is a
people-centric profession, but then fail to acknowledge the
importance of the viewpoints of our people? Cornell is a counter-example.
So, after having taking Clifford Chance from, if not the rocks,
at least the gathering storm, what are Cornell's parting
words of
advice to those who are, or aspire to, managing partner? Pithy:
- Focus on the big things
- Extend your network—down to junior partners and
associates
- Delegate
- Be consistent
- No bullshit
- Be thick-skinned
To those who still feel called to the challenge, all rise.
Courtesy of The New Yorker:
This is not to either recommend or condemn discounts
for valued clients—that's a topic for another day!
The New Jersey Law Journal, with permission, re-published a recent post about Allen & Overy's new "managing associate"
and "of counsel" tracks. Many thanks to Ron
Fleury, their nifty editor.
"Adam Smith, Esq." is honored and delighted to host Blawg
Review #39; I consider myself in excellent company given
the distinguished and talented people who have hosted Blawg
Review in the past.
This week we celebrate:
Epiphany: n. 1. From
the Greek epiphania "manifestation," often
referring to the appearance of a divine being. Christ's appearance
to Paul on the Damascus road was an epiphany. The word is used to describe
the first appearance of Christ to the Gentiles in the visit of the
Magi to the baby Jesus (Matthew 2:1-12), an event celebrated January
6.
2. Epiphany in fiction, when a character suddenly experiences a deep
realization about himself or herself; a truth which is grasped in an
ordinary rather than a melodramatic moment.
The most famous representation of "The Epiphany" in art
history is doubtless Giotto's (more
formally, Giotto di Bondone: Italian, Florentine, 1266/76–1337) from
New York's own Metropolitan
Museum of Art:

My wife, who majored in art history at Vassar, has indelibly memorized
this educational little ditty placing Giotto in art-historical context:
"Giotto, Giotto, Giotto-Giotto: Renaissance
He paints in the morning and he paints at night;
If it's a Giotto it'll turn out right.
Giotto, Giotto, Giotto- Giotto: Renaissance."
Of course, here in New York City we celebrate the end of the 12 days
of Christmas with our own tradition: The annual rite of The
Ceremony of the Mulching of the Christmas Trees, jointly supervised
by the NYC Sanitation and Parks Departments:
Before we begin our cyberspatial tour, like all accomplished explorers,
we need to be well-equipped. To that end I commend to you Google
Pack, a handy-dandy Swiss Army-knife compilation of everything the
Prepared Scout of virtual-space needs, from Adobe Acrobat and Firefox
to anti-virus and anti-spyware armor.
Let the tour begin!
Alito Fireworks
"Adam Smith, Esq." is resolutely non-partisan
and apolitical. That
said, without question the best-quality daytime drama scheduled
for this coming week will be the nomination hearings for Judge Samuel
Alito to SCOTUS—they promise an extremely high entertainment-value
quotient, and I for one intend to Tivo them in their entirety. But
for commentary and observation, I'll turn to those who plow these fields
for a living, starting with the newest addition to the Law.Com "Inside
Opinions: Legal Blog Network," the consummately qualified
Howard Bashman of How
Appealing.
The "Epiphanic Moment" ("EM") from this post is Howard's
intimate knowledge of the witnesses who will be testifying in favor
of Alito this week: "I know about all of these judges as a result of
having handled numerous appeals in front of the Third Circuit over
nearly the past sixteen years and having clerked for a judge serving
on the Third Circuit for two years before that. Here are my quick insights..."
Our friends at Law.Com have their
comprehensive "A Field Guide to the Alito Confirmation Hearings." You
were expecting, perhaps, a red hawk pair nesting above Fifth Avenue?
Meanwhile, over at the Electronic
Privacy Information Center, they've a remarkably comprehensive complete
copy of a conference report from the Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library
at Princeton University—the conference
in question taking up "The Boundaries of Privacy in
American Society," chaired by none other than then-Princeton-student
Samuel Alito, who was responsible for putting the conference together,
doing the research behind it, and preparring the "remarkable summary
that accompanies the final report." This should have
the C-SPAN junkies going back to their Red Bull's for stamina.
NSA Surveillance Fireworks
Also on the late-breaking political newsfront, we have the story
that our very own NSA ("No Such Agency") has developed an expertise
in data-mining that Wal-Mart would envy, but rather than applying it
to how our household purchases index on Crest and Pampers, they've
applied it to determine how many degrees of separation lie between
you and Osama. Jay Leno has his own take on this revelation: According to a new poll, President Bush's approval ratings are on the rise. A lot of these polls are phone polls and people were worried Bush is listening in.
Kierkegaard Lives, a new blog to me, provides a "wire-tapping
link
repository"
aiming to constitute one-stop-shopping for digerati running down primary
sources on this.
For the attention-span challenged, yesterday TalkLeft uncovered a Congressional Research Service report questioning the NSA/White
House's authority. EM from the summary:
"The 44-page report said that Bush probably cannot claim
the broad presidential powers he has relied upon as authority to order
the secret monitoring of calls made by U.S. citizens since the fall
of 2001."
For the record, I do not subscribe to the cynical view of this imbroglio
that it's merely a matter of whose ox is being gored—that if
you're an upstanding American citizen you have nothing to fear from
the snoops, so what's your problem, buddy? Rather, I view the debate
as the latest incarnation of the timeless, "no permanent solution"
tension between human liberty and free and open societies, and the
reality that "the Constitution is not a suicide pact."
Lawyers Behaving Badly
This topic can only be introduced by: "Where oh
where to begin?!"
f/k/a reports on
a lawyer who:
"... gets three months in jail for being one of the
two major actors in a complicated scheme to steal millions of dollars
[$25.6-million, in fact] from people he himself describes as "decent,
hardworking people looking for an honest way to resolve their debt
issues.""
How is this possible? Maybe the judge was swayed by character witnesses,
or the lawyer's own questionable character:
"Attorney
Lisa B. Shelkrot came up with the usual defense gobbly- gook, including:
"What stands out [in letters from prominent members of
the community] is his selflessness and commitment to
service."
"It was a fear of destitution, not a high flying lifestyle ... that
lead him to this. Sinnott had a "deeply and tragically" flawed
personality."
My EM question to Ms. Shelkrot: Are you yourself buying that
for a second?
And since when does being "flawed" exempt you from responsibility
for the consequences of your premeditated actions over a period of years?
We don't apply this standard in dealing with children or dogs, and it's
not time to start with grown, bar-passing adults.
More seriously, Jack Balkin asks whether
it now "seemed as if there was no legal proposition, no matter
how outlandish, that you couldn't get some prominent lawyer these days
to defend." Answering his own question, he writes:
"Lawyers have always, to my knowledge, been willing to come
up with clever and ingenious arguments for the interests they represent."
But he's only warming up: "Put another way, we have all known
for many years that lawyers are rhetorical whores; their job is to
confuse, obfuscate, and make unjust and illegal things seem perfectly
just and legal, or, if they cannot quite manage that feat, to muddy
up our convictions sufficiently that we conclude that it's a close
case. There is nothing new about this."
"Nothing new?" Meaning it's essentialy an ineradicable and hopeless
condition? Well, not quite. EM moment in bold (my
emphasis: "Lest I be misunderstood, I do not mean to say
that law and legal doctrine counts for nothing, and that lawyers have
no independent role to play other than as political cheerleaders for
one side or the other. Rather I mean to say that the
law always needs help from other sources in political culture if it is to do its job
appropriately. The rule of law, I would insist, is not a purely legal
or professional ideal-- it is a political ideal."
TalkLeft decodes what
motivates outstanding federal prosecutors to go to the defense side—and
questions whether they ever really make the transition. "The
real problem is most of these former high-level prosecutors can't make
the mental shift. They don't have it in them." Or,
as former Deputy Attorney General James Comey puts it in a quote so
rich you couldn't make it up (EM in bold): “You go from being paid to do the right thing every day, from having the freedom never to make an argument you don’t believe in, to being a defense attorney, where you are duty-bound to make the best argument you can,†he told the New York Law Journal. “I have a tremendous respect for people who do defense work, and it’s not lying, but in a private moment, sometimes, you say, ‘Geez,
this is a bunch of baloney.’â€
And you really anticipate even a soupcon of "zealous
representation"
on behalf of a criminal
defendant from Mr. Comey? TalkLeft certainly doesn't: "Pathetic...irksome
beyond description."
For a moment's worth of comic relief, the always-reliable Walter
Olson at Overlawyered chronicles a
Dallas restaurateur who sued the Dallas Morning News over a review
of his restaurant, "Il Mulino"—specifically,
so it would appear, over the newspaper critic's take on Il Mulino's
bolognese and vodka sauce. I am pleased to be able to report
that the matter has been settled without admission of much of anything,
it seems, but with a promise of a second review from the newspaper. "And
you're ugly," perhaps?
The serious message here is simply, Who comes off looking worse? The
benighted restaurateur who exponentially increased circulation of
the critical review by his action, or the lawyer who took good money
from him to help?
Craig Williams, another Scottish lawyer with a penchant for economics,
regales us
at May It Please the Court with Major League
Baseball's claim that it "owns" all baseball statistics. The
party offending MLB's expansive notion of the territorial reach
of its intellectual property is one CBC Distribution & Marketing,
a fantasy baseball game operator—dependent for the reality
of its fantasy upon real-world baseball statistics. EM of
the post: "Next thing you know, they'll be charging the fans
to quote statistics to one another."
Mauled Again kicks
off 2006 with a confident prediction:
"The culture of corruption, of bribery, of putting one's
own selfish interests above those of the public one is required to
serve will also trigger yet another easy-to-predict Top Ten tax story
of 2006. At least one politician, one celebrity, and one lawyer will
run afoul of the tax law by failing to file a tax return or by failing
to pay income taxes."
What's to be done? You might try starting young:
"It is a challenge getting across to law students the point
that when they enter the profession, and even as law students, they
are subject to a higher set of integrity standards than those that
apply generally to citizens of the nation."
Put that on your refrigerator.
On a less consequential, but equally depressing, note, Matt Homann
of "the [non]billable hour" reports seeing a serious-minded
piece of advice that clients should not talk to
their lawyers until the deal they're doing is completely worked out.
What on earth would prompt such advice? "Our
predominant business model"—the billable hour.
In contradistinction to the billable hour, Greatest American
Lawyer advocates serious, candid discussions with clients
about budgets. The goal? Try, "Truth."
Over at Houston's Clear Thinkers, Tom Kirkendall writes about "The High Price of Asserting Innocence," and sees a vicious
double standard infecting the Enron prosecution, wherein the right
to defend oneself has essentially been emasculated by trigger-happy
prosecutors and the federal sentencing guidelines' emphasis on co-operation
as a get-out-of-jail-free card:
"Last week, former Enron chief accountant Richard Causey
pled guilty to a single count of securities fraud and agreed to a
seven-year prison term after vigorously defending himself from multiple
charges of business crimes for over two years. Had he elected to
defend himself at trial against the charges and lost, he would have
faced an effective life sentence."
Yet another triumph of the Law of Unintended Consequences; but lawyers
created this injustice. Can't lawyers be expected to fix it?
Part of the problem may be that lawyers can't be expected to fix
injustices if they simply can't be trusted in the first place. To
that point, Dennis Kennedy recounts the "baffling" decision of
the Florida Bar's Board of Governors to prohibit lawyers from looking
at metadata—presumably on the principle that gentlemen don't
read other gentlemen's mail. To my mind, the only conceivable
rationale for such (a feckless) rule of "Enforced Ignorance" is
that the children can't be trusted near the liquor cabinet.
Is there hope? Point of Law writes about "Merit-Based
Judging" and urges all
of us (is the MSM listening, here?) to get the notion out of our
heads that judicial decision-making is a clone of the legislative
process, where all that matters are results. Ted Frank comes
out decisively in favor of hoping Alito will truly judge matters
strictly on the merits, and even though Frank is confessedly pro-business,
he argues correctly that "business
is better off in the long run with a judge and judiciary that decides
cases on the merits" rather than "a hack judge who makes
his or her decisions based on the identity of the parties in the
caption."
Wouldn't it be nice if a greater proportion of the American public
(and again, the American media) understood that "decisions based
on the identity of the parties" enjoys a one-for-one identity with
being "a hack."
Finally, we can all breathe a sigh of relief—inbetween chuckles,
anyway—at the extremely welcome news that The
Bitch is Back.
Practice, Practice, Practice
Lest you begin to form the impression that lawyers
never get any real work done, we have an eclectic roundup of practitioners
opining on their specialties. I'm not sure any one of this
exactly qualifies for an "EM," being, as
they are, proudly technical and rational self-contained essays,
you hey, you might learn something; I surely did.
- Ever wonder about the extraterritorial application of US Antitrust
Laws? You understand, of course, that ever since Alcoa (1945),
it's been settled that they do have some such reach. Law
& Society sets
us straight (and I'm personally a sucker
for their banner image).
- Patent Baristas educates us on the USPTO's proposal
to limit continuations, which have
"become the current whipping boy." (Who knew?!) PB opines
that "this has not been thought through very well," and as part
of their argument to that effect notes (and trust me, I quote):
"Note
that proposed Rule § 1.78(f)(2) provides that for applications
that fall under set proposed § 1.78(f)(1) above, there will
be a rebuttable presumption that the nonprovisional application
contains at least one claim that is not patentably distinct
from at least one of the claims in the one or more other pending
or patented nonprovisional applications. In that case, [etc.]" I'm willing to take them at their word.
- Staying in IP-land for a moment, The Invent Blog notes that
David Allen's "Getting
Things Done" (a collection of techniques
I heartily endorse), which relies upon tabbed folders for organization,
wouldn't be possible without the handiwork of one James Newton
Gunn, who in 1897 obtained a patent for tabbed folders and
index cards. Respect your ancestors, I always say!
- My e-friend Ingo Forstenlechner has just completed his Ph.D.
thesis titled "Impact of Knowledge Management on Law Firm
Performance - An Investigation of Causality across Cultures" and
wants to let you know that you can get a copy directly
from him. I'm sure Joy
London already has hers. Here's an excerpt from Ingo's
abstract of the thesis:
"The set of cause and
effect relationships at the heart of the [balanced] scorecard
- referred to as the success map – is at the core of this research,
which aims to investigate if the link between managing knowledge
and financial performance really exists and – if it does – how
it can be influenced." [And his conclusion?] [...] "This
thesis provides the empirical evidence
for a link between KM and organisational performance."
- Carolyn Elefant
at My Shingle offers very practical advice (##'d 1 through
5, in fact) for people
seeking contract
work from local attorneys or solos.
- And last, both Carolyn and
I contributed to the launch of Law.com's "Career Center" earlier
last week.
And The Final Word Goes to The Economics of Law Firms
I hope you all saw that coming.
Patrick Lamb, at In Search of Perfect Client
Service, essays
upon "The Essence of Leadership." The first
thing he does, with a hat tip to Tom Peters, is distinguish
leadership from management: "Management has a lot
to do with answers. Leadership is a function of questions.
And the first question for a leader always is "what do we
intend to be?""
Those of you who were comparative lit majors may
be interested to know that I took off from the same Harvard
Business School paper Patrick is launching from, in a post
of my own, here.
The anonymous Wired GC kicks
off the New
Year by turning his thoughts to New Ventures, and to the pilot
fish that invariably accompany them in schools, your friends the
Venture Capitalists, and The
Top 10 Lies of VC's as recounted
by Guy Kawasaki, who's in a position to know. My personal
favorite is #9 (EM included) :
"Do you know why we all know about Google's amazing
return on investment? The same reason we all know about Michael
Jordan: Googles and Michael Jordans hardly ever happen. If they
were common, no one would write about them. If you scratch beneath
the surface, venture capitalists want to invest in proven teams
(eg., the founders of Cisco) with proven technology (eg., the basis
of a Nobel Prize) in a proven market (eg., ecommerce). We
are remarkably risk averse considering it's not even our money."
Gerry Riskin at Amazing Firms, Amazing Practices (who
I know well, whom I hope to have breakfast with in New York this
coming week, and who deprived the world of stand-up comedy of a
potential ace when he stuck to law-land) turns the
kleig
lights on "old-fashioned bad management" at Dorsey & Whitney's
London office, leading the en masse departure of 8 associates. What,
Gerry asks rhetorically, does it cost to recruit 8 associates? And
what firm would
"dare subtract that number from the billing revenue of some
maniac in order to determine compensation?" Another rhetorical
question. But the EM is this: Thanks
at least in fair measure to the blogosphere, dysfunctional
people cannot remain anonymous.
Finally, the question you've all had in the backs of your minds,
especially those of you contemplating hosting another Blawg Review
of your own some day: Am I glad I did it?
Yes, I thoroughly enjoyed it! I had the chance to delve
deeper into some old friends, to meet some new ones (as it were),
and finally, to point you all towards two of my own post-children
of the past week:
It's good to be King For A Day. Still, I hope I've done
justice to Blawg
Review #38's 10 Resolutions for Better Blogging.
And to all a good night, and a most merry and enjoyable 12 Days
of Christmas next year.
Blawg Review has information
about next week's host, and instructions how to get your blawg
posts reviewed in upcoming issues. Final Note: I'm also interviewed there.
Legal Times is asking, "What Five Questions Will Law Firms
Face in 2006?" I'd like to suggest there's really only one
question, and these "five" are each just facets of the same phenomenon.
Their five:
- More merger mania?
- Soaring compensation?
- Billing rates topping out?
- Further cost cutting?
- Client relationships more critical still?
Mergers: Although framed as an across-the-board
issue, the fact is that merger activity is highly focused on firms
establishing, or beefing up, their beach-heads in just two cities: Washington,
DC, and New York. I've long been of the view that a Washington
presence (which need not be jumbo-sized) is de rigueur for
a national firm to be taken seriously. We simply live in regulatory
times, and it's almost irresponsible not to have the ability to join
the legislative/administrative conversation at its primary source.
(No, I don't own any property on K Street, but I wish I did!)
New York is likewise critical simply because it's the financial capital
of North America, as well as hub to industries ranging from publishing
and advertising to fashion and—surprise—law itself. But
unlike DC, mere "presence" doesn't cut it here: Firms
need a critical mass in NYC to make it into the serious consideration
set. What's "critical mass?" Roughly, north of
125 lawyers.
The biggest challenge is that in both cities, the pickings of merger
targets are getting slim. That's why I predict we'll see
more and more smaller-bore mergers where national firms opportunistically
pick up relatively little firms that have an attractive specialty. Just
as an example, Seyfarth Shaw picked
up a Manhattan-centric real estate
firm, Mandel-Resnik (specializing in representing co-op's and condos)
as of January 1. Total haul? A grand total of seven
partners—but arguably (and IMHO) an excellent fit, as real estate
is a labor-intensive industry and Seyfarth Shaw is definitely a "go-to"
labor law firm.
Look for more of these rifle-not-shotgun targets. But do not
envision "merger mania" as an undifferentiated nationwide phenomenon.
Compensation: Obviously, here are two "compensation"
markets: Partners and associates.
As for associates, I predict we will finally see the pent-up dam burst,
so to speak, and starting salaries will get the first bump-up (+$10,000
seems to be the number people are using) since the (in)famous dot-com-driven
Gunderson-Dettmer pop to $125,000 in 2000.
The partner compensation market is also bifurcated, if you will, into
the equity/non-equity market and the lateral market. In a coincidence,
today we also saw the release of the annual
summary of financial results
for the Top Ten Bay Area firms, and it tells a tale of high (and unsustainable)
rates of growth in the ranks of non-equity partners, and extremely
parsimonious additions to, or even subtractions from, the equity ranks. Just
a sampling:
- Morrison & Foerster shifted 50 partners—15%
of the entire partnership's ranks—from equity to non-equity.
- At Pillsbury-Winthrop, the firm ended 2005 with 10% fewer equity
partners than it began the year, despite absorbing Shaw-Pittman.
- Gibson-Dunn, while LA and not Bay Area-based, switched to a tiered
partnership last year.
- Wilson-Sonsini is the only firm on the list that remains "single
tier," without non-equity partners.
In other words, non-equity ranks are here to stay, or to grow.
As is activity in the lateral marketplace. Don't think there's
a war for talent? Well, there is, and it's being fought primarily
with the weapon of money. Attractive laterals are not commodities,
and the fight to gain and then retain them only escalated last year.
Billing Rates: Pressure from corporate
clients to cut legal expenses increased last year and will only continue
to rise. So:
"The string of rapidly escalating billing rates has pretty
much run its course," says Bruce McLean, managing partner at Akin Gump
Strauss Hauer & Feld. "We're going to have to find different ways to
improve profitability."
The problem is that just what those "different ways" are is opaque,
at least if firms limit their toolset to fiddling with billing rates.
"Alternative fee arrangements?" Mostly imaginary. Or, as John Beisner,
DC managing partner at O'Melveny, puts it somewhat drily: "There is
a challenge to find ones that are broadly applicable."
In other words, plain old dumb discounting remains the order
of the day.
Was I harsh with that "dumb discounting" jibe? Yes
and no. Yes, I was harsh in that long-term, solid, favored clients
deserve recognition of their status, and the clearest recognition is
a break on fees. Plus, the firm enjoys economies with established
clients in that there's no new-business-development overhead. But
no, I will stand by it to the extent that just saying, "let me take
10% off—'special for you today!,'" as they say in New York, does
not engender loyalty and in fact invites the question: "If you
can make nice money at 10% off, what sucker would ever pay full freight? [And
the next question is: "How about 20% off?"]
The demise of the billable hour has been foretold so often that we've
stopped covering it here; at least until there's some tectonic change
in the landscape. Suffice to say that imagination and innovation
will ultimately prevail in billing structures. We'll
know it when we see it.
Costs: Many strategies avail themselves here,
and outsourcing seems to be the favorite son. Far be it from
me to disdain outsourcing—indeed, I've often noted that BigLaw
can outsource to the Midwest or the South (internal offices or otherwise)
without needing to skip 12 time zones away—but the issue of quality,
perceived or actual, remains a live one. If I'm a Fortune 500
GC hiring Cravath or Wachtel, do you think "outsourcing" is an option?
I would argue that same (correct and legitimate) mindset applies to
almost any firm in the AmLaw 50, if not the AmLaw 200. The back
office is one thing, but substantive work? First thing you know,
that GC will say to him/herself: "I'm not paying firm X 90¢ on
the dollar to ship their work to Cleveland; I'll hire another inhouse
person for 30¢ on the dollar." Beware
false economies.
The article makes pregnant reference to another potential source of
"cost savings," to wit practice specialization. The
somewhat ham-handed attempt to make this point gropes at it obliquely
by offering that "par[ing] down practice groups" may be "another option."
What "paring down," a/k/a specialization, means, is simply this: Become
a boutique.
Client Relationships: Aaah, at last the heart
of the matter, and where all of these questions intersect.
Think about it: Mergers are driven by the need to offer a more
complete offering to clients; compensation is driven by the war for
talent, in order to serve clients; new billing initiatives are 110%
driven by clients, not firms; cost-cutting matters only in a world
where clients demand value for money.
As it should, it all comes down to clients.
Which leaves us where?
I suggest, back in the land of virtuous and vicious cycles. Strong
firms will deepen and extend their client relationships by providing
a more compelling array of services from highly talented people priced
to yield a compelling value. Weaker firms will lose cost-conscious
clients as their talent pool dwindles, billing models stagnate, and
practice group offerings ossify.
It's not five questions, it's one: How can your firm in 2006
get closer to your clients?
Your firm is dedicated to client service as one of its pre-eminent
goals, if not the absolutely highest priority, right?
Not so fast. Do you have a lawyer serving full-time as "Client
Services Advisor," serving as an ombudsman on behalf of the firm's
clients and responsible for creating and overseeing more than 60 "client
service team s" (and counting)? Akin-Gump does, in the person
of Iris
Jones.
Swell: What's a "client service team?," you're asking.
Essentially, it's a tool for formalizing and institutionalizing collaboration
among the various lawyers serving Important Client X. An
example will aid understanding even better than a description. Here's
how the "Technology-Copyright-Internet" group works:
"The TCI attorneys participate in client service teams with Akin Gump’s
patent attorneys, litigation attorneys and other practice groups. This
collaborative commitment to client service enables Akin Gump to assist
in providing clients with comprehensive counseling in all areas of
IP and overlapping areas of the law."
The goal is to approach the client relationship from the perspective
of the client's business (and its concomitant legal needs) rather
than from the perspective of the firm's legal expertise (which
may or may not be germane to the client's business).
The latter approach—starting from the perspective of
the firm rather than the client—is conceptually just plain mistaken.
In practice, what does this really mean?
- First, as noted, it requires genuine collaboration. Teams
need to be assembled and re-assembled as the client's business and
legal posture changes. Now the team may need some focused litigators;
next quarter an offshore tax expert; and the quarter after that an
employment maven. Iris Jones' job is to stay on top of all
this and make sure that today's "A Team" doesn't become tomorrow's
"Irrelevant Team."
Does this mean partners need to "buy in" with their heart and soul? Check.
Yes, this can be the hard part: We all know that collaboration
is not in the law school curriculum. But never underestimate
the power of self-interest to trump training. As one Akin-Gump
partner put it: "In an increasingly competitive environment,
the client service team has been invaluable in [strengthening] our
relationship."
- Second, it requires plain old information-tracking. Call
it "Client Relationship Management" if you like, but lawyers must
have one centralized repository for everything germane about the
client's legal needs and the history of its relationship with the
firm. We've all had the experience of phoning (say) the cable
company to ask a service-related question or inquire about a bill,
only to find ourselves forced to explain everything from square one
with a succession of several different people. As uninspiring
as this is with the cable company, it leaves a positively ghastly
impression coming from a supposedly sophisticated law firm.
- Lastly, it means the client service team has to have a vision of
where the client fits within the firm's strategic plan—a vision
which is both clear
and nuanced. Lest I be accused of throwing around the phrase
"strategic plan" loosely, I'll try to define it: "Strategic
plan" in the sense I mean it is not the 3-
or 5-year document delivered from the mountaintop and promptly shelved
for terminal verboseness or immediate irrelevancy (the latter fate
being nicely described by the epithet "OBE," or "overtaken by events"). Rather,
a strategic plan in this sense is a continuously evolving awareness
of the fit between (i) the marketplace's specific demands; (ii) the
firm's ability (or short-term lack thereof) to meet those demands;
and (iii) how the firm can develop to most closely align its capabilities
and offerings with the evolving market.
Note the focus throughout is on "the clienit" and "the market" rather
than "the firm" or "the lawyer."
We have all known in our heads for some time, even if we have not
acted on it with our hearts, that excellent legal skills are merely
the price of admission in today's globally competitive market. That
means they cannot pretend to be your distinctive calling card; they're
table stakes.
What could provide an enduring distinction, on the other hand, is
responding to your clients' business (and, as a follow-on thereto,
legal) needs with the same alacrity and professional focus the client
itself would apply internally. Client service teams may not be
the only route there, but they surely start at the right end of the
service spectrum.
"Blawg Review #39" will be hosted right here at "Adam Smith, Esq."
this coming Monday, January 9th. If you're not familiar
with the concept, Blawg Review is
the legal blogosphere's iteration of what's becoming a happy, entertaining,
and valuable custom among the digerati: Creating a weekly digest
of some of the "best of" posts of that week in whatever specific topical
area is in question.
Many of the weekly topical digests are called "Carnival of the [insert
topic here]" for reasons now lost in the mists of internets past. One
of my favorites, which will surprise no one, is "Carnival
of the Capitalists."
So I'm asking for reader participation.
- Legal bloggers: Send me a link to what you
consider one of your smartest, sassiest posts of this week.
- Loyal readers: Send me a link to posts from
your travels in the legal blogosphere that you either think I ought
to see, wish you had written, or both.
And thanks in advance to one and all for checking out Blawg Review
#39 this coming Monday.
In case you haven't seen the home-page of Law.com today, they are
launching their "Career Center":
And this is the article that I'm up there, as it were,
alluding to.
Improve on your weaknesses or build on your strengths: Which
one would you focus on to achieve greater success?
If, like 59% of people surveyed by Marcus Buckingham, co-author of First,
Break All the Rules, you chose "work on your weaknesses,"
you're wasting your time, says
Buckingham. At best, focusing
a critical eye on your weaknesses might help prevent failure; but
it will never help you attain excellence.
More importantly, the same goes, in spades, for people you manage. What
makes a great manager?
- The ability to find, and then capitalize upon, employee's unique
traits.
- The knack for finding an employee's talent and turning it into
performance.
- Playing "chess, not checkers"—knowing that employees
work differently and have different "moves."
- In short, knowing that you don't have a dozen associates working
for you; you have a dozen individuals.
What exactly are an employee's, or an associate's, "strengths and
talents?" Actually, it's not a metaphysical question; it's
an empirical exercise. What are they good at? What do they
seem to enjoy? What do they learn quickly? What assignments
do they feel are intrinsically rewarding? Give them more
of those things, and less of other things; in other words, capitalize
on their natural proclivities. Swim downstream, not upstream.
How intuitively sensible is this? Plenty: Haven't you
experienced in your own career the sense that at times you were shadowboxing
with cotton wool? That you couldn't get traction, couldn't be
effective, couldn't figure out what you were doing wrong, and at some
point didn't even want to know? (If you've never been there,
would you kindly email me the special recipe for your coffee in the
morning?) But at other times you've been in the flow, challenged
but not overwhelmed, engaged but not enervated, learning but not struggling.
Assume others are no different. As a gross generalization,
litigators and deal lawyers have different personality types. Forcibly
transplanting an individual who has found his niche from one
practice to the other will almost surely be an excursion into the veil
of tears.
Taking matters a step further, what distinguishes a manager from a
leader?
Let's grant that leaders are fundamentally different than managers. Buckingham
believes the key distinction is that leaders:
- are focused on the future, not the present
- are almost maniacally, unshakably optimistic
- have tremendous confidence in their own suitability for the role
as leader, and
- rally people behind a "universal truth."
The "universal truth" must be embraced, above all, with pellucid clarity.
So, for example, when Rudy Giuliani assumed the mayoralty of the famously
ungovernable New York City in 1993, he did not attack problems with
the schools and the parks and the municipal unions and crime and the
budget, although any and all of these were certainly deserving of SWAT-team
interventions: He focused on reducing crime and improving the
overall quality of life by starting with a crackdown on almost perversely
minor offenses, from turnstile-jumping and graffiti in the subways
to "squeegee men" in the streets.
And Giuliani consistently tied it all back to a vision of a future
New York City—a safe, clean, civilized one.
As Buckingham puts it: "When you want to lead, start with the
future. Get specific. And get vivid."
As of this morning, there's a noteworthy new
kid on the legal blogosphere
block: "The
Wall Street Journal Online, Esq."
Well, not quite—actually, they're calling it simply their "Law
Page," but a "centerpiece" of their new coverage is their
new Law
Blog. Grab the feed.
Who's behind this?:
"We've beefed up our legal team with two great journalists:
Ashby Jones, our legal editor, was a reporter at The Deal and American
Lawyer Media. A former litigator and clerk to a federal judge, Ashby
is a graduate of Haverford College and the University of Michigan Law
School. He'll be writing The FLaw column.
"Peter Lattman will be writing our law blog. Peter joined the Online
Journal from Forbes Magazine. Before becoming a journalist, he was
a litigator at a law firm and worked on Wall Street. He is a graduate
of Harvard University and Fordham University Law School. The blog will
also include contributions from reporters at The Wall Street Journal
and Dow Jones Newswires."
A heartfelt "Welcome" to the blawgosphere is in order!
And you thought blogging was going to turn out to be a fad....
What are your New Year's resolutions? And, of greater interest,
what makes you think you might really observe them?
Let's take a step back: Isn't there something fundamentally
irrational about New Year's resolutions to begin with? After all, if you want
to start running five miles a day, getting to work earlier, or cutting
out the cheesecake, you shouldn't wait until January 1st to start.
Prof. Thomas Schelling, this year's Nobel prize-winner in economics
for his work on conflict, has something to tell us about this: He's
written at
some length about the archetypal situation in which a "resolution"
may come in handy to change your actual behavior. He posits a divided
self: One part of us wants to stop smoking, the other part wants
to reach for the cigarette after dinner. One part of us wants to
get up earlier, the other part wants to hit the snooze button. So
far, so familiar.
The insight he adds is that these two parts of ourselves exist at
different times. The Angel Part is in control before
the decision is actually made; the Devil Part takes over at the moment
of truth. So the question becomes: Are there tools/techniques/strategies
we can employ to strengthen the Angel's ability to constrain the Devil
when push comes to shove? There are some.
- The very fact that you have made A Formal (Written, I hope) Resolution
raises the price of non-compliance; if you've also made the commitment
public with a spouse or loved one, posted it on the refrigerator and
above your desk, so much the better. Shame doesn't always trump
temptation, but you can give it a fighting chance.
- Make bright-line rules, not vague incantations of improvement. So: Rather
than "eat less," specify "zero carbs." Rather
than "only one cigarette after a meal" (what exactly is a "meal" in
today's grazing/snacking society?), "one cigarette only at 1pm and
7pm."
- Physically remove temptation: If you have to go out to buy
dessert, the Angel may have time to reassert control, but had it been
ready to hand in the freezer, the Devil starts out on top.
- Bargain with yourself and promise a reward for the pain inflicted
by compliance with the Resolution: If you lose 10 pounds, you
can buy a new dress. Just make sure the incentive is something
you really want; make it meaningful, so that its loss would be painful.
So what are my New Year's Resolutions?
- To connect with more readers of "Adam Smith, Esq." in the real, off-line
world—one of the greatest rewards of this site, to me.
- To try to make "Adam Smith, Esq." ever more insightful, carefully
reasoned, and just plain intrinsically interesting. And
- To celebrate everyone's entitlement to one vice of their choosing.
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